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THE FAILURE OF AGENCY-FORCING:
THE REGULATION OF AIRBORNE
CARCINOGENS UNDER SECTION 112 OF THE
CLEAN AIR ACT
JOHN D. GRAHAM*
Professor Graham analyzes section 112 of the Clean Air Act, a pro-
vision intended by Congress to achieve ambitious regulatory ends by con-
straining agency discretion. The performance of the Environmental
Protection Agency in implementing section 112 reveals flaws inherent in
this "agency-forcing" approach to statutory design. In particular, sec-
tion 112 directs the Agency to list formally those pollutants that it deter-
mines-without statutory guidance-to be "hazardous." This directive,
added to the requirement that the Agency promulgate within short dead-
lines very stringent rules regulating listed pollutants, has led to a lack of
result that is perceived as bureaucratic footdragging. This lack of result
is, however, due to the statutory design itself, and especially to its denial
to the Agency of authority to consider costs and benefits in writing regu-
lations governing sources of listed pollutants. A package of reforms is
proposed to bring needed flexibility to section 112.
I. INTRODUCTION
The mandate to the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) expressed in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 19701
reflects a radical departure from what has been called the "New Deal
model" of administrative policymaking.2 Under the traditional regula-
tory approach, Congress entrusted expert agencies with broad authority
to advance the public interest by devising informed solutions to complex
economic and social problems. Expertise was housed in the so-called
"independent" agencies or commissions, which were to be insulated from
* Assistant Professor of Public Policy Analysis, Department of Health Policy and
Management, Harvard School of Public Health. Financial support was provided by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency, Assistance Agreement CR807809, and by the Scientific
Conflict Mapping Project, Department of Health Policy and Management, Harvard School of Public
Health. All opinions and errors should be attributed to the author. For helpful comments, thanks
are due to Joe Adamchic, John Bailar, Robert Barnard, Robert Hahn, Christopher Schroeder, and
to everyone associated with the Scientific Mapping Project.
I. Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1685 (codified as later amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Clean Air Act is codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7642 (1982).
2. On the New Deal ideal, see B. AcscRMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DiRTY AIR 4-7
(1981) and references therein.
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political influence and judicial intervention. Yet decades of experience
with the New Deal model have generated disappointment, criticism, and
mistrust.3 Much of the new social regulatory legislation passed in the
1960's and 1970's was designed to rectify the perceived shortcomings of
the traditional approach to regulation.4
The "agency-forcing" nature of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970 reflects this repudiation of the New Deal model.5 Under the
agency-forcing approach, blind faith in administrative discretion was re-
placed by strict procedural and substantive demands on bureaucratic
policymaking. Activists in Congress, spurred by their allies in consumer
and environmental groups, used statutory language and legislative his-
tory to specify the ends/means relationships that would be expected to
govern administrative decisions. 6 The federal judiciary was recruited as
an institutional ally in this aggressive bid to force implementation of
health, safety, and environmental programs.
It has been fifteen years since passage of the 1970 Amendments, and
scholars are beginning to assess and evaluate the consequences of the new
approach to regulation. At the risk of oversimplifying the lessons of a
growing and complex literature, suffice it to say that the agency-forcing
model has not proven to be the panacea that its creators might have
hoped it would be.7 This article extends the academic critique of the
agency-forcing model by examining a somewhat less publicized provision
of the Clean Air Act dealing with hazardous air pollutants.
The narrow purpose of the article is to build a case for reform of
section 112 of the Clean Air Act. The larger purpose of the article is to
criticize the basic model of administrative policymaking embodied in the
Clean Air Act. The argument will emphasize the degree to which ad-
ministrative behavior can be perverted by the nature of statutory de-
3. See id. at 7-8 and references therein.
4. On this new social regulation, see National Research Council, Risk and Decision Making:
Perspectives and Research 2-4, 28-32 (Jan. 1982) (unpublished manuscript) (describing the growth
of regulatory legislation passed to protect the health of consumers, workers, and ordinary citizens).
5. On the characteristics of the agency-forcing approach, see B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER,
supra note 2, at 104-15.
6. For a defense of the agency-forcing approach in the case of the Clean Air Act, see Ingram,
The Political Rationality of Innovation: The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, in APPROACHES TO
CONTROLLING AIR POLLUTION 12-50 (A. Friedlander ed. 1978).
7. See generally R CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION (1983) (an econo-
mist's critique of EPA's stationary source programs); L. LAVE & G. OMENN, CLEARING THE AIR:
REFORMING THE CLEAN AIR ACT 2-5, 13-18 (1981) (problems in setting ambient air quality stan-
dards); R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACr (1983)
(difficulties with the EPA/judiciary relationship); L. WHITE, THE REGULATION OF AIR POLLU-
TANT EMISSIONS FROM MOTOR VEHICLES (1982) (an economist's critique of EPA's mobile source
programs); Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New DeaL" Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.
1466 (1980) (perversities arising from implementation of section 111 of the Clean Air Act).
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mands and judicial review. The article is not so much a challenge to the
worthiness of environmental goals as it is a critique of the efficacy of
agency-forcing mandates as tools for accomplishing those goals. The rec-
ommendations for reform do not call for a complete return to the New
Deal approach. Instead, they suggest that section 112 should reflect a
calculated mixture of confidence in agency expertise and skepticism
about loosely constrained agency discretion.
II. REGULATING AIRBORNE CARCINOGENS
The role of air pollution in the development of human cancers is not
well understood. While it is known that man-made sources emit substan-
tial quantities of carcinogenic substances into the atmosphere,8 it is not
clear whether human exposure to these substances is a major cause of
specific cancers. For example, estimates of the proportion of lung cancer
in the United States attributable to air pollution range from virtually zero
to as much as twenty percent.9 Smoking is known to be the dominant
cause of lung cancer,10 but exposure to air pollution may be an additive
or synergistic causal factor. 1
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 do not provide a general
framework for regulation of airborne carcinogens. In the absence of spe-
cial legislative directions, environmental groups have urged the EPA to
regulate carcinogenic air pollutants under section 112 of the Act. 12 Pres-
sure from environmentalists has, for example, caused the EPA to issue
emission standards under section 112 for asbestos and vinyl chloride, two
8. B. FULLER, J. HUSHON, M. KORNREICH, R. QUELLITTE, L. THOMAS & P. WALKER, PRE-
LIMINARY SCORING OF SELECTED ORGANIC AIR POLLUTANTS (1976) (report prepared for Office of
Air and Waste Management, EPA) (survey of industrial sources reveals that over 50 known or
suspected chemical carcinogens are emitted into the air).
9. For evidence that air pollution plays no significant role in causation of lung cancer, see Doll
& Peto, The Causes of Cancer: Quantitative Estimates of Avoidable Risks of Cancer in the United
States Today, 66 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1191, 1247 (1981), and Higginson, Multiplicity of Factors
Involved in Cancer Patterns and Trends, J. ENrvL. PATHOLOGY & ToxICOLOGY, Feb.-Mar. 1980,
at 113, 123 (1980). For evidence supporting the contrary thesis, see R. WILSON, S. COLOME, J.
SPENGLER & D. WILSON, HEALTH EFFECTS OF FOSSIL FUEL BURNING: ASSESSMENT AND MITI.
GATION 174 (1980); N. Karch & M. Schneiderman, Explaining the Urban Factor in Lung Cancer
Mortality: Report to the Natural Resources Defense Council 2-6 (Dec. 15, 1981), printed in Clean
Air Act-Part 2: Hearings on New Technology, New Source Performance Standards, Nonferrous
Smelters, and Toxic Air Pollutants, Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 491 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981
Hearings].
10. See generally J. CAIRNS, CANCER: SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 43-45 (1978).
11. See eg., Cohen, Arai & Brain, Smoking Impairs Long-Term Dust Clearance from the
Lungs, 204 SCIENCE 514, 514 (1979).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982).
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chemicals known to cause cancer in humans. 13
Despite scientific uncertainty about the carcinogenic effects of air
pollution, the EPA is considering additional regulatory steps to reduce
public exposure to suspected airborne carcinogens. The Agency has been
studying thirty-seven "priority" air pollutants, many of which are
known, based on animal experiments or occupational studies, to cause
cancer.14 Estimates of the number of cases of cancer associated with
these thirty-seven pollutants range from several hundred to several thou-
sand per year. 15 The EPA is adopting emission limits for benzene, 16 one
of these pollutants, because high occupational exposures to the chemical
have been associated with an incidence of leukemia in excess of what
would be expected if benzene were harmless. 17 Although environmental
exposures to benzene are typically very much lower than occupational
exposures,18 the EPA has taken the position that any exposure to a car-
cinogen, however small, poses some incremental risk of cancer to ex-
posed individuals. 19
13. Initial Proposed Rule, 36 Fed. Reg. 23,239 (1971) (emission standards for asbestos; pro-
posed Dec. 7, 1971); Final Emission Standards, 38 Fed. Reg. 8819 (1973) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
§§ 61.140 -. 156 (1984)) (asbestos); Initial Proposed Rule, 40 Fed. Reg. 59,531 (1975) (emission stan-
dards for vinyl chloride; proposed Dec. 24, 1975); Final Emission Standards, 41 Fed. Reg. 46,559
(1976) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.60 -.71 (1984)) (vinyl chloride).
14. COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., DELAYS IN EPA's REGULATION OF HAZARDOUS AIR
POLLUTANTS 8-11 (1983) [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT ON SECTION 112] (discussion of how
list was developed, including table of 37 pollutants).
15. Compare Clean Air Act Amendments of 1983-Part 2: Hearings on S. 768 Before the Senate
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 50, 51 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
1983 Hearings] (statement of William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, EPA) (preliminary EPA
study estimates excess cancers from industrial point sources in neighborhood of "a few hundred")
with Toxics Problem Said Larger Than Expected Up to 2,010 Annual Cancers Seen Possible, CHEMI-
CAL REG. REP. (BNA) No. 8, at 430 (July 20, 1984) (estimate based on draft EPA study) and with
Summary of Data on Specific Pollutants and Cancer Risk Estimates Excerpted from EPA Draft Study
on Air Toxics Problem in United States, 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 616, 616-18 (Aug. 10, 1984) (sum-
mary table from draft EPA study).
16. See generally EPA Board to Review Health Data on Emissions from Gasoline Chain, 8
CHEMICAL REG. REP. (BNA) No. 3, at 82 (Apr. 20, 1984); Drops in Air Emissions from Sources
Prompt EPA to Reconsider Proposed Standards, 7 CHEMICAL REG. REP. (BNA) No. 51, at 1749
(Mar. 23, 1984); Plan to Control Benzene Under Section 112 Set by EPA, Includes Final, Proposed
Rules, 14 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 33, at 1435 (Dec. 16, 1983).
17. See, e.g., Infante & White, Benzene: Epidemiologic Observations of Leukemia by Cell Type
and Adverse Health Effects Associated with Low-level Exposures, 52 EVTiL. HEALTH PERsPs. 75
(1983).
18. See Notice of Addition to List of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 42 Fed. Reg. 29,332, 29,332
(1977); INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, No. 29, EVALUATION OF THE CAR-
CINOGENIC RISK OF CHEMICALS TO HUMANS 99-103 (1982).
19. Interim Procedures and Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,402 (1976) (interim EPA procedures
and guidelines for health risk and economic impact assessments of suspected carcinogens based on
the premise that "there is no such thing as a completely safe dose"). A recent EPA estimate is that
up to 246 cancers per year may be attributable to environmental benzene exposure. See Products of
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Both environmentalists and industrialists object to current EPA pol-
icy toward airborne carcinogens. Environmentalists point to the dozens
of unregulated pollutants and the long delays in standard-setting that
have occurred in connection with the few pollutants already listed under
section 112.20 Industrialists object that the EPA might be compelled to
consider regulation-without regard to technological or economic con-
siderations-of pollutants and source categories that do not pose a signif-
icant risk of cancer.21 Both criticisms derive from a more fundamental
and subtle indictment of the current process. The design of section 112
has produced an array of perverse responses by reasonably well-inten-
tioned public servants. These responses include: excessive concern about
the scientific basis of listing decisions; indefinite delays of decisions to list
clearly carcinogenic pollutants; partial loss of agency control over the
priority-setting process; unnecessary delays in adoption of final emission
standards; reliance on legally questionable uses of risk assessment and
cost information; adoption of technology-based standards that are eco-
nomically inefficient; and failure to consider potentially effective and eco-
nomical emission-control strategies.
A package of administrative and legislative reforms could minimize,
if not eliminate, many of the deficiencies in the current process. These
changes in section 112 could, in the long run, enable more expeditious
and cost-effective regulation of airborne carcinogens. In particular, the
reforms advocated in this article are designed to clarify and accelerate
the listing of carcinogenic air pollutants, to relax unreasonable rulemak-
ing deadlines, to focus administrative resources on pollutants and source
categories that pose a significant risk of cancer, and to provide the EPA
with explicit authorization to weigh costs and benefits and to implement
alternative pollution control strategies. At a minimum, the reform pack-
age would assure that implementation of section 112 involves public dis-
cussion of the real scientific, technological, economic, and ethical issues.
The normative analysis is developed in several stages. Part 11122 is a de-
scriptive account of the legislative and regulatory history of section 112.
Part IV2 3 is a critical analysis, from the perspectives of public health,
equity, administrative process, and economic efficiency, of current statu-
Incomplete Combustion Said Responsible for Up to 820 Cancers Annually, 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 569
(Aug. 10, 1984).
20. See, eg., 1981 Hearings, supra note 9, at 694-97 (statement of David D. Doniger, National
Clean Air Coalition); id. at 709-10 (statement of Khristine Hall, Environmental Defense Fund).
21. See, e-g., id at 722-24 (statement of Michael A. James, Chemical Manufacturers Associa-
tion); id at 573-75 (statement of William J. McCarville, Chairman, Health Assessment Task Group,
Chemical Manufacturers Association).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 26-104.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 105-279.
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tory and administrative approaches. The reform package is then ad-
vanced in part V.24 The concluding remarks in part V125 place the
recommendations in a broader philosophical and political context.
III. HISTORY OF SECTION 112
It will be useful to survey the legislative, judicial, and administrative
history of this provision of the Clean Air Act. An outline of the legisla-
tive history will be followed by a review of the administrative design of
section 112, early EPA rulemakings, the 1977 congressional amend-
ments, subsequent EPA rulemakings, and recent congressional
deliberations.
A. Legislative Compromise in 1970.
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 were debated and passed at
a time when the political momentum behind environmental protection
was powerful.26 The Senate passed a massive clean air bill authored pri-
marily by a subcommittee chaired by Senator Edmund Muskie.27 The
House passed a more limited bill that was similar to the Nixon Adminis-
tration's proposal. 28 The most prominent issues at the time were emis-
sion-control deadlines for the automobile industry and, to a lesser extent,
new source performance standards for stationary sources of air pollu-
tion.29 A major yet unpublicized discrepancy between the House and
Senate bills was the treatment of hazardous air pollutants.
While the House bill had no section devoted exclusively to hazard-
24. See infra text accompanying notes 280-94.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 295-308.
26. The Earth Day activities had dramatized the nation's environmental problems, and politi-
cians were maneuvering to position themselves favorably on the issue. President Nixon introduced
national clean air legislation and later issued a reorganization plan creating the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency. See Message of the President, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970), reprinted in ENviRON-
MENTAL QUALITY: THE FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrrY
294-300 (1970). Senator Edmund Muskie, D-Me., was eager to preempt Nixon's initiatives and to
overcome adverse media publicity caused by Ralph Nader's 1970 report, Vanishing Air. See J. EsPo-
srro, VANISHING AIR (1970). Muskie was chairman of the key Senate Subcommittee on Environ-
mental Pollution and a major force behind federal environmental legislation in the 1960's. See R.
MELNICK, supra note 7, at 28. As a probable Democratic candidate for President in 1972, Muskie
wanted to refute Nader's charge that Muskie was unwilling to be "tough" on industrial polluters.
See id. On the legislative history of the Clean Air Act of 1970, see generally Marcus, Environmental
Protection Agency, in THE POLITIcS OF REGULATION 267-303 (. Wilson ed. 1980).
27. The Senate bill received unanimous support. See generally J. DAVIES & B. DAVIES, THE
POLITICS OF POLLUTION 55 (1975).
28. The House bill passed by a vote of 374 to 1. Id. at 54.
29. See R. MELNiCK, supra note 7, at 28-30.
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ous air pollutants, 30 the Senate bill contained a section entitled "National
Emission Standards-Hazardous Air Pollution Agents," which specified
procedures for listing hazardous air pollutants31 and created a "nondis-
cretionary" duty to regulate listed pollutants within strict timetables.32
Emissions of hazardous air pollutants from both new and existing
stationary sources would be prohibited unless the EPA could show "that
a departure from such a prohibition for [a] stationary source will not be
hazardous to the health of persons."' 33 The Senate committee report
reveals that the section was originally intended to "encompass a limited
number of pollutants."' 34 Asbestos, cadmium, mercury, and beryllium
are mentioned as possible candidates.35 The report describes the defini-
tion of "hazardous" as "relatively restrictive, '36 apparently because of
the severe nature of the health effects encompassed by the definition. A
restrictive definition was perceived as appropriate because "a total prohi-
bition on emissions is a step to be taken only where a danger to health, as
defined, exists."' 37 If a pollutant is not deemed "hazardous," yet poses a
"significant danger to public health or welfare," the Senate report de-
scribes another section of the bill as the appropriate statutory basis for
regulation. 38
During negotiations between House and Senate conferees, the Nixon
Administration recommended that the provision on hazardous air pollu-
tants be deleted. 39 The conferees rejected the Administration's recom-
30. The House bill treated hazardous pollutants as an extreme case of emissions that "may
contribute substantially to endangerment of public health." While the House bill authorized the
EPA to prohibit construction and operation of new stationary sources of extremely hazardous emis-
sions, it also provided for a variety of exemptions and generally called for emission standards based
on economic and technological feasibility. I CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FOR TIE SEN-
ATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93D CONG., 2D SEss., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN
AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970 195-96 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as LEGIS. HIST. OF
1970 AMENDMENTS] (summary of House bill contained in conference report).
31. A "hazardous air pollutant" was defined in the Senate bill as "one whose presence, chroni-
cally or intermittently, in trace concentrations in the ambient air, either alone or in combination
with other agents, causes or will cause, or contribute to, an increase in mortality or an increase in
serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible damage to health." Id. at 496.
32. Id. at 495-98 (report on section 115 of the Senate bill). "Nondiscretionary" duties are typi-
cal of the agency-forcing model. An agency's failure to discharge such a duty will expose the agency
to citizen suits and judicial supervision. See infra note 112.
33. Id. at 496.
34. Id. at 420-21 (Senate committee report on section 115).
35. Id at 420.
36. Id
37. Id.
38. Section 114 of the Senate bill was intended to cover other pollutants that might pose a
significant danger to public health. Id.
39. In a letter to House and Senate conferees, Secretary of the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare Elliot Richardson argued, for the Administration, that a separate section for haz-
ardous air pollutants was unnecessary. Sections 114 and 116 of the Senate bill, argued Richardson,
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mendation, preferring a distinctive regulatory approach for hazardous air
pollutants. The Senate approach was adopted as section 112, albeit with
notable revisions. A "hazardous" air pollutant was defined as "an air
pollutant to which no ambient air quality standard is applicable and
which in the judgment of the Administrator causes, or contributes to,
. . . an increase in mortality, or an increase in serious irreversible, or
incapacitating reversible, illness."'' ° The most important change was sub-
stitution of the precautionary language---"may cause"-for the more ex-
acting language in the Senate bill-"causes or will cause". The conferees
also appear to have changed the basis for setting national emission stan-
dards. The conference substitute called for the Administrator to set
emission standards "at the level which in his judgment provides an ample
margin of safety to protect the public health from such hazardous air
pollutants. '4 1 The explicit prohibition on emissions was removed, but
consideration of economic and technological factors was not explicitly
authorized.
B. The Design of Section 112.
The approach chosen by Congress for control of hazardous air pol-
lutants, while based on the same theory of environmental rights that
characterizes the entire Act,42 differs somewhat from the approach cho-
sen for other types of air pollutants. The cornerstone of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1970 was the complex federal/state relationship es-
tablished for control of the so-called "criteria" pollutants under sections
108 through 110.43 Section 112 is one of the major exceptions to this
federalist approach to pollution control.44 The point of section 112 is to
provided sufficient authority to regulate hazardous air pollutants, including the possibility of zero-
emission limits for all facilities in some cases. Administration's Letter to Conference Recom-
mending Certain Provisions, by HEW Secretary Elliot Richardson (Nov. 17, 1970), reprinted in
LEGIS. HIST. oF 1970 AMENDMENTS, supra note 30, at 211-17.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (1982).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1982).
42. See Schroeder, Foreword: A Decade of Change in Regulating the Chemical Industry, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1983, 1, 21; see also infra notes 295-99.
43. Section 108 requires the EPA to issue "criteria documents" describing the adverse health
and welfare effects of all widespread air pollutants. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (1982). Under section 109, the
EPA is directed to establish, for each "criteria pollutant," both primary and secondary ambient air
quality standards. The primary standards would "protect the public health" with "an adequate
margin of safety;" secondary standards would protect against "welfare" effects of pollution, such as
impaired visibility and property damage. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1982). While the EPA was to set the
ambient standards, the states were directed by section 110 to implement emission controls that were
necessary and sufficient to achieve the federal ambient standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982).
44. Section 111 empowers the EPA to establish emission standards for categories of new
stationary sources that "[contribute] significantly to . . . air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (1982). In addition,
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allow the EPA to bypass the unwieldy processes of establishing ambient
standards and reviewing state implementation plans. The toxic air pollu-
tants to be regulated under section 112 were supposed to be more danger-
ous-that is, more severe in their health effects-than the criteria
pollutants, thus justifying direct EPA control of emission sources. In
light of the dangers involved, Congress created a simple two-step
rulemaking process: A specific pollutant is first listed as hazardous,
based on a consideration of relevant scientific data; then, uniform na-
tional emission standards are established for each source category.45
Once a pollutant is listed, the EPA must propose emission standards
within 180 days, hold a public hearing within thirty more days, and pub-
lish final emission rules within 180 days of the proposal.46 These dead-
lines are applicable "unless [the EPA] finds, on the basis of information
presented at such hearings, that such pollutant clearly is not a hazardous
air pollutant." 47 The initial listing decision imposes a nondiscretionary
duty upon the EPA within the specified deadlines to propose and to pro-
mulgate national emission limits. Citizens have the right under the
Clean Air Act to sue in federal courts to compel EPA compliance with
such nondiscretionary duties.48
Emission standards adopted under section 112 are to take effect im-
mediately for new sources and within ninety days for existing sources. 49
Waivers for existing sources may be granted by the EPA for up to two
years if such delay is necessary to install abatement equipment and if
interim steps are taken to assure that public health is protected from
"imminent endangerment.1 50 Extended exemptions can be granted by
the President only for national security purposes.5 1 Section 112 permits
states to adopt their own emission standards as long as they are at least
as stringent as those required by the EPA. If states submit adequate
control programs to the EPA, the Administrator is authorized to dele-
gate his implementation and enforcement authority to the states.52 As of
November, 1983, about nineteen states and twenty-one local air pollution
section 202 provides the EPA with power to set emission limits for new motor vehicles. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7502 (1982). Finally, section 112 provides the EPA with direct authority over new and existing
stationary sources of hazardous air pollutants. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982).
45. The EPA is expected to publish and periodically revise "a list which includes each hazard-
ous air pollutant for which [it] intends to establish an emission standard." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(b)(1)(A) (1982).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1982).
47. Id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1982).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1)(A), (B)(i) (1982).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1)(B)(ii) (1982).
51. 42 u.s.c. § 7412(c)(2) (1982).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1) (1982).
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control agencies had developed such programs.53
C. Implementation by the EPA: 1970 to 1976.
During the Nixon and Ford Administrations, four pollutants were
listed and regulated under section 112: asbestos, beryllium, mercury,
and vinyl chloride. These regulations can be attributed in large measure
to tenacious legal tactics by environmental groups. Although the EPA
promptly listed and proposed standards for asbestos, beryllium, and mer-
cury, the final standards were promulgated only after the Environmental
Defense Fund (EDF) obtained a court order compelling the EPA to do
so.54 The EPA adopted final standards for vinyl chloride while under
constant legal pressure from both the EDF and the Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC).5 5
Asbestos and vinyl chloride are of special interest because they were
the first carcinogens regulated under section 112. The EPA considered
prohibiting emissions of asbestos into the atmosphere or banning the pro-
duction, processing, and use of asbestos.56 These drastic options were
rejected, even though the EPA could not identify a positive amount of
asbestos emission that would not be hazardous. 57 Although the Agency
speculated that "there are levels of asbestos exposure that will not be
associated with any detectable risk," it concluded that "these levels are
not known." 58 The Agency rejected the drastic alternatives on the
grounds of enforcement -difficulties and adverse economic conse-
quences. 59 Instead of prohibition, the EPA opted for limitations on visi-
ble emissions and for requirements for certain production procedures and
operations.60 Environmentalists chose not to litigate the EPA's failure to
ban asbestos emissions.61 Quantitative emission standards were not es-
tablished because it was not practicable at that time to measure asbestos
emissions, especially from operations such as building demolition.62
53. States Moving Ahead with Toxics Programs in Absence of Federal Action, Official Says, 14
ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 30, 1371-72 (Nov. 25, 1983).
54. Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 3 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,173,
20,173 (D.D.C. 1973).
55. Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and Policy of
Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY L. Q. 497, 565-88 (1978).
56. 38 Fed. Reg. 8820, 8820-22 (1973) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.140-.156 (1984)).
57. See id.
58. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, supra note 56, at 8820.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Doniger, supra note 55, at 572-73 (explaining reaction of environmental groups to as-
bestos standard).
62. The Supreme Court ultimately struck down parts of the asbestos standard because the Act
was read to require quantitative emission limits only. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434
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During the vinyl chloride rulemaking, the EPA took the position
that "for carcinogens there may be no atmospheric concentration which
poses absolutely no public health risk."' 63 In light of that position, the
EPA considered the possibility that only zero-emission standards for car-
cinogenic pollutants could protect the public health. Indeed, environ-
mentalists urged the EPA to ban vinyl chloride products for which
substitutes were currently available and gradually to phase out other
vinyl products as substitutes were developed.64 In contrast, industrial
commentators argued that emission standards for vinyl chloride should
be set at each plant based on a comparison of costs and benefits. 65
The EPA rejected both of these suggestions, deciding instead on
vinyl chloride standards that require emission reduction by means of the
best available technology. A zero-emission rule was rejected because
available substitutes for vinyl chloride lacked certain desirable features,
such as nonflammability, and because substitute chemicals might intro-
duce new adverse health or environmental effects.6 6 The cost-benefit ap-
proach was also rejected; the EPA argued that section 112 permitted
consideration of costs "only to a very limited extent." 67 The EDF sued
the EPA on the grounds that the vinyl chloride standards were imper-
missibly lenient, but the case was dismissed when the parties reached a
settlement.68 The EPA apparently agreed to tighten the standard and to
accept zero vinyl chloride emissions as a goal, 69 but the standard has
never been strengthened.70
U.S. 275, 286-89 (1978). The Court did not, however, address the issue of whether zero-emission
standards are required by the Act for a "nonthreshold" pollutant, see infra note I 1l, such as asbes-
tos. See Doniger, supra note 55, at 573 n.386 (agreeing that the Court did not address zero-emis-
sions issue). Congress eventually amended section 112 to permit design, equipment, work practice,
or operational standards where numerical emission standards are not feasible. 42 U.S.C. §
7412(e)(1),(5) (1982). Under this authority, the asbestos rules have been reinstated. See Amend-
ments to Asbestos Standard, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,658 (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.140-.156 (1984)).
63. Initial Proposed Rule, 40 Fed. Reg. 59,532, 59,533 (1975) (national emission standard for
vinyl chloride, proposed Dec. 24, 1975).
64. Adoption of Regulation, 41 Fed. Reg. 46,560, 46,561-62 (1976) (discussing significant com-
ments to proposed regulation).
65. Id. at 46,562.
66. Id. at 46,561.
67. Id. at 46,562.
68. Environmental Defense Fund v. Train, No. 76-2405 (D.C. Cir., settled and dismissed, June
24, 1977).
69. This characterization of the settlement is based on D. Doniger & A. Ahmed, National
Resources Defense Council, Inc., Comments on the Proposed National Hazardous Air Pollutant
Emission Standards for Inorganic Arsenic 15 (submitted to the EPA, Jan. 31, 1984).
70. The EPA proposed amendments to the vinyl chloride standard that embraced a goal of zero
emissions, Initial Proposed Amendments to Rule, 42 Fed. Reg. 28,154 (1977) (proposed June 2,
1977), but these amendments were never adopted. Some clarifications of the existing standard were
published. 42 Fed. Reg. 29,005 (1977) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.60-.70 (1984)).
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D. The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments.
The pace of rulemaking pursuant to section 112 was not a major
point of controversy during congressional deliberations on reauthoriza-
tion of the Clean Air Act in 1976 and 1977. Environmentalists in the
House of Representatives were, however, disappointed that a greater
number of hazardous air pollutants had not been listed by the EPA. The
House report on the 1977 Amendments criticized the EPA for its preoc-
cupation with criteria pollutants:
[T]here are numerous other air pollutants which to date have not been
subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act. Despite mounting evi-
dence that these pollutants are associated with serious health hazards
and despite recommendations from prestigious medical and scientific
bodies, the Agency has failed to promulgate regulations to institute
adequate control measures for these unregulated pollutants. 71
As a result, the 1977 Amendments added another "agency-forcing" pro-
vision, section 122, which was designed to spur rulemaking activity with
respect to radioactive pollutants, arsenic, cadmium, and polycyclic or-
ganic matter.72
The 1977 Amendments also added a more inclusive definition of a
hazardous air pollutant. A hazardous air pollutant, according to the re-
vised definition, is "an air pollutant to which no ambient air quality stan-
dard is applicable and which in the judgment of the Administrator
causes, or contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be antici-
pated to result in an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irre-
versible, or incapacitating reversible, illness."' 73 The word "may" was
relocated to appear before the new phrase "reasonably be anticipated
to"-a revision intended "to emphasize the precautionary or prevent-
ative purpose of the Act." 74 In view of litigation over the EPA's stan-
71. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1977).
72. Section 122 requires the EPA Administrator to decide within one year (or two years for
radioactive emissions) whether or not these four categories of pollutant are hazardous within the
meaning of section 112. 42 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (1982). According to the House report, each of the
four pollutants specified in section 122 "has been found to be cancer causing or cancer promoting in
laboratory animal experiments and in human beings in occupational settings." H.R. REP. No. 294,
supra note 71, at 36. Indeed, the House report contains a detailed discussion of the scientific evi-
dence linking the four pollutants to various adverse health effects. Id. at 36-40. It is apparent, there-
fore, that Congress intended that the EPA devote significant agency resources to developing
emission standards for these pollutants.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (1982).
74. H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 71, at 51. The same protective language was added to
sections 108 (criteria for national ambient air quality standards), 111 (new source performance stan-
dards), 112 (hazardous air pollutants), 202 (new motor vehicle emission standards), 211 (regulation
of fuels and fuel additives), and 231 (aircraft emission standards). The new language in these sec-
tions was described by the House committee report as "a standardized basis for future rulemaking to
protect the public health." Id. at 50.
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dard for lead emissions, 75 Congress wanted to clarify that the EPA was
not required to wait for proof of adverse human health effects before
taking protective action under the Act.
E. Subsequent EPA Rulemaking: 1977 to 1984.
During the Carter Administration, the EPA did not accomplish
much in the way of setting emission standards for hazardous air pollu-
tants. Despite a one-year deadline in the 1977 Amendments, the EPA
never made formal listing decisions on cadmium or polycyclic organic
matter. Affirmative listing decisions were made for radionuclides 76 and
arsenic,77 but emission standards were not even proposed before Presi-
dent Carter left office. In response to an EDF petition, benzene was
listed as a hazardous air pollutant in June, 1977.78 Yet the EPA did not
even propose emission standards for categories of benzene sources until
the period from April, 1980, to January, 1981,79 thus leaving the issue of
final standards to the Reagan Administration.
In total, the Carter EPA listed three pollutants as hazardous, pro-
posed emission standards for one pollutant, and promulgated no final
standards. As Khristine Hall of the EDF testified before a House Sub-
committee in 1981: "I can only say it is one of the environmental groups'
grave disappointments that the Carter Administration didn't do some-
thing on hazardous air pollutants. In fact, they were urged repeatedly by
both EDF and [the National Clean Air Coalition] to do something and
didn't."' 0 In fairness to the EPA, it should be noted that the agency
responded to an EDF petition and proposed an ambitious "generic" pol-
icy for listing and regulating airborne carcinogens under section 112.81
75. In a pathbreaking decision on environmental health regulation, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held, in an en bane decision, that the EPA's lead rules were a lawful
exercise of discretion under the Clean Air Act, even though adverse health effects from lead expo-
sure were not conclusively proven at the time of the Administrator's decision. See Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1977).
76. See 44 Fed. Reg. 76,738 (1979) (notice, Dec. 27, 1979).
77. See 45 Fed. Reg. 37,886 (1980) (notice, June 5, 1980).
78. See Addition to List of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 42 Fed. Reg. 29,332 (notice, June 8,
1977).
79. See Proposed Emission Standards, 45 Fed. Reg. 26,660 (1980) (proposed Apr. 18, 1980)
(benzene emissions from maleic anhydride plants); Proposed Emission Standards, 45 Fed. Reg.
83,448 (1980) (proposed Dec. 18, 1980) (benzene emissions from ethylbenzene/styrene plants); Pro-
posed Emission Standards, 45 Fed. Reg. 83,952 (1980) (proposed Dec. 19, 1980) (benzene storage
vessels); 46 Fed. Reg. 1165 (1981) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.110-.117 (1984)) (proposed Jan. 1,
1981) (standards for fugitive benzene emissions).
80. 1981 Hearings, supra note 20, at 729 (statement of Khristine Hall, Environmental Defense
Fund).
81. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Pollutants: Policy and Procedures for Identify-
ing, Assessing, and Regulating Airborne Substances Posing a Risk of Cancer, 44 Fed. Reg. 58,642
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The effort was not completed before Carter left office and a final, general
policy for airborne carcinogens has never been issued by the EPA. The
fact that the EPA was inclined to propose an entire policy framework for
airborne carcinogens-as opposed to other hazardous air pollutants-is
an indication that the policy underlying the statute was perceived by the
agency to be ambiguous or unacceptable.
If Carter's record on hazardous air pollutants is characterized as
disappointing, the record of EPA Administrator Gorsuch in the Reagan
Administration was abysmal. From March, 1981, when Gorsuch took
office, until her resignation in the spring of 1983, the EPA issued no list-
ings, no proposed emission standards, and no final rules under section
112. Meanwhile, the Agency was ordered by federal courts to propose
emission standards for radionuclides 82 and arsenic.8 3 The EDF and the
NRDC also informed Gorsuch before her resignation of their intent to
sue the Agency for failure to issue final emission standards for benzene.
8 4
Gorsuch's intransigence had the unfortunate effect of diverting the atten-
tion of members of Congress from fundamental problems with the design
and implementation of the statute. Members of the key environmental
committees in Congress began to consider crude statutory schemes that
would automatically list various substances within strict deadlines,8 5 re-
gardless of the status of the EPA's scientific and regulatory analyses.
Under intense pressure from Congress and environmentalists, the EPA
under Administrator Ruckelshaus made public commitments in Novem-
ber, 1983, to announce regulatory decisions on twenty-three priority pol-
lutants by January, 1986, and an additional eight to ten priority
pollutants sometime in fiscal year 1986.86
Despite these commitments, there were indications that the Ruckel-
shaus EPA was trying to avoid extensive use of section 112. While emis-
sion standards for radionuclides were proposed under court order,87 they
were later withdrawn because of inadequate scientific justification.88 In
(1979) (proposed Oct. 10, 1979). The "generic" policy was the subject of public hearings, and be-
came the target of a large volume of critical written comments by both industrial and environmental
organizations.
82. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 551 F. Supp. 785, 789 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
83. New York v. Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
84. See NRDC v. EPA, 14 ENVTL. L. RiEP. (ENVTL. L. INsT.) 10,026 (D.D.C. 1984).
85. Congress Fails to Act on Clean Air Rewrite, 1982 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 425, 432-33.
86. 1983 Hearings, supra note 15, at 54-55 (statement of Wiliam D. Ruckelshaus, Administra-
tor, EPA).
87. See Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 551 F. Supp. 785, 786-89 (N.D. Cal. 1982); see also Proposed
Rule, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,076 (1983) (proposed Apr. 6, 1983).
88. See EPA Withdraws Radionuclide Standards: Environmental Group Responds with Suit,
[Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1051, 1051 (Oct. 26, 1984) (EPA official quoted as
saying that the risk involved was "rather trivial").
Vol. 1985:100]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
addition, the EPA published reasons for not listing toluene 9 and not
regulating polycyclic organic matter as a per se hazardous air pollu-
tant.90 Controversial emission standards to curtail arsenic emissions
were proposed,91 but the shutdown of a major copper smelter in Tacoma,
Washington, rendered the fate of the proposal uncertain.92 While some
sources of benzene emissions have been regulated,93 others have been ig-
nored or left unregulated due to "insignificant risk."'94 Instead of listing
acrylonitrile under section 112, the EPA apparently plans to seek control
of this known human carcinogen through agreements with state agen-
cies.95 Coke oven emissions were recently listed under section 112,96 but
it is not clear that further control is technologically feasible in many
plants. 97
As Congress considered reauthorization of the Clean Air Act in the
early 1980's, the record of the EPA under section 112 surfaced as a focal
point of debate. Environmentalists and industrialists recommended that
Congress amend section 112 rather than reauthorize it in its then-current
form. Environmentalists wanted new statutory language that would au-
tomatically list specified pollutants within fixed deadlines.98 Industrial-
ists recommended that the EPA Administrator be permitted to consider
economic and technological data as well as health data when setting
emission standards. 99 In 1982, political infighting over section 112 was
particularly intense in the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
where the badly split Committee voted out a bill calling for automatic
listing of thirty-seven priority pollutants within four years. 100 A consen-
89. Decision Not to Regulate, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,195 (1984).
90. Proposed Decision Not to Regulate, 49 Fed. Reg. 5580 (1984).
91. Proposed Standards for Inorganic Arsenic, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,112 (1983) (proposed July 20,
1983).
92. See Tacoma ASARCO Copper Smelter to Close in June 1985, Company Board Announces,
[Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 388, 388-89 (July 6, 1984).
93. See Proposed Emission Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,522 (1984) (proposed June 6, 1984)
(coke by-product recovery plants); 49 Fed. Reg. 23,498 (1984) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.110-.1 12,
61.240-.247 (1984)) (final emission standards for fugitive emission sources).
94. Proposed Withdrawal of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 8386 (1984).
95. See Aim Said to Approve Plan to Regulate Acrylonitrile Through State Programs, 15 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 167, 167-68 (1984); State Control of Acrylonitrile Regulation Nears Release in Policy
Statement, Aim Says, 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1008, 1008 (1984).
96. Addition to List of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 49 Fed. Reg. 36,560 (1984).
97. See Control of Coke Ovens at High-Risk Plants Poses Problems for EPA, Agency Official
Says, 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 793, 793-94 (1984).
98. E.g., 1981 Hearings, supra note 9, at 709-10 (statement of Khristine Hall, Environmental
Defense Fund).
99. Id. at 722-23 (statement of Michael A. James, Chemical Manufacturers Association).
100. A showdown occurred between Rep. John Dingell, D-Mich., chairman of the Committee,
and Rep. Henry Waxman, D-Cal., chairman of the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment.
A bill supported by Dingell would have deleted the "ample margin of safety" language in section 112
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sus favoring a similar bill emerged in the Senate Committee on Environ-
ment and Public Works. 101 Although the clean air bills approved by the
House and Senate committees in 1982 were a victory for environmental-
ists, the efforts were ultimately inconsequential because the Ninety-Sev-
enth Congress failed to pass a reauthorization of the Clean Air Act. The
Clean Air Act was considered again by the Ninety-Eighth Congress, 102
but election-year politics caused the issue to be delayed until the Ninety-
Ninth Congress. 10 3 In the meantime, the Ruckelshaus EPA entered into
negotiations with key congressional staff members in order to find a mu-
tually-acceptable reform package. 1°4
IV. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 112
As originally conceived, section 112 called for the EPA to adopt
stringent quantitative emission standards for a limited number of espe-
cially dangerous air pollutants. While EPA performance to date is con-
sistent with that conception, there nonetheless exists a widespread belief
that the EPA's implementation of the section has been disappointing. 10 5
and replaced it with authorization for the EPA to set emission standards based on technological and
economic feasibility. Although the bill also required the EPA to evaluate the list of 37 priority
pollutants within a four-year deadline, it would have allowed the EPA to delay a listing decision
beyond four years if insufficient information were available to decide whether or not to list a pollu-
tant. The Dingell-backed bill was defeated by a vote of 20-21. The Committee adopted, by a vote of
22-20, a watered-down version of a Waxman-backed bill that deleted the ample-margin-of-safety
language yet retained the health orientation of emission standards. In addition, the bill required.
automatic listing of the 37 pollutants if the EPA did not make an explicit listing decision within four
years. 1982 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 432-33.
101. In the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Chairman Robert Stafford, R-
Vt., also cleared a bill with major revisions to section 112. See S. 3041, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
Listing decisions on 20 pollutants would be required within two years and 20 more would confront a
five-year deadline. Failure to make a decision on a pollutant within the allotted time would cause
automatic listing of the pollutant under section 112. Proposed emission standards would then be
required within one year. All emission standards under the bill would be "established at the level
that requires the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through . . . application of the
best system of continuous emission reduction available." Id. at 14. If the Administrator cannot
determine that the best available technology will protect the public health with an adequate margin
of safety, then more stringent levels of emission control would be required. A report accompanying
the Stafford bill states that the committee envisions that the number of pollutants to be regulated
under section 112 "may well be at least an order of magnitude larger than the number regulated to
date." Id. at 15.
102. See DingellAir Toxics Amendment Giving EPA More Assessment Time is Supported by Can-
non, 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 36 (May 11, 1984).
103. See Clean Air Markup Session Snags on Acid Rain Provisions, 42 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP.
987 (Apr. 28, 1984); Acid Rain Provisions Cut from Clean Air Bill, 42 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1009
(May 5, 1984).
104. 1983 Hearings, supra note 15, at 3, 19 (statement of Joseph A. Cannon, Assistant Adminis-
trator for Air and Radiation, EPA).
105. See 1981 Hearings, supra note 9, at 487 (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, D-Cal.,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Health and the Environment, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce)
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Growing public and scientific attention to the cancer problem has caused
the EPA to identify dozens of potentially carcinogenic air pollutants. 106
Because cancer is clearly "hazardous" within the meaning of section 112,
the number of pollutants that might be regulated under section 112 has
grown enormously since the provision was written in 1970.
Despite the perceived need for regulation of dozens of airborne car-
cinogens, the EPA has listed only eight pollutants as hazardous and has
issued final emission standards for only five.107 Most of this rulemaking
activity occurred before 1977, the year the EPA identified the thirty-
seven priority candidates for listing and regulatory decision. 108 The
EPA's failure to implement section 112 is attributable to a combination
of unworkable statutory provisions and inappropriate administrative
choices-the slow pace of rulemaking is not simply a reflection of sinister
political forces. Section 112 has been administered ineffectively by all
EPA administrators-five individuals who have had different partisan af-
filiations and varying degrees of commitment to environmental protec-
tion.10 9 The persistence of implementation problems throughout the
section's history suggests that there may be fundamental statutory and
administrative obstacles-in addition to technological and economic bar-
riers-to expeditious control of airborne carcinogens.
A. The Cumbersome Listing Process.
Section 112 is designed so that profound regulatory implications
flow from the initial decision to list a pollutant as hazardous. Once a
pollutant is listed, the EPA has a nondiscretionary duty to promulgate
(describing EPA "tardiness" in implementation of section 112 as "disturbing"); id. at 699 (statement
of David Doniger, National Clean Air Coalition) (EPA "has done very little to control the dozens-
perhaps more than 100-unregulated substances" since 1970); 1983 Hearings, supra note 15, at 60
(statement of William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, EPA) (acknowledging criticisms that imple-
mentation of section 112 has been "plagued" by "avoidable" delays); Dowd, Debate on Hazardous
Air Pollutants Continues, 18 ENvTL. Sci. & TECH. 153A (1984) (Congress unhappy with lack of
decisionmaking on section 112).
106. 1983 Hearings, supra note 15, at 51 (statement of William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator,
EPA) (acknowledging that cancer is "the most important reason" for concern about implementation
of section 112, and that "a firm base of public support" exists for control of airborne carcinogens);
see also supra note 8.
107. Listed pollutants, in chronological order, are asbestos, mercury, beryllium, vinyl chloride,
benzene, radionuclides, arsenic, and coke-oven emissions. See infra note 152.
108. GAO REPORT ON SECTION 112, supra note 14, at ii (EPA developed list of 37 pollutants in
1977 based on 1976 contractor report).
109. The five administrators of the EPA have been William Ruckelshaus (1971-1973 and 1983-
1985); Russell Train (1974-1977); Douglas Costle (1977-1981); Ann Gorsuch Burford (1981-1983);
and Lee Thomas (1985-present). On the backgrounds of the first four administrators, see R. MEL-
NICK, supra note 7, at 39.
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national emission standards within a period of one year. 110 That duty
may require, as we shall see, that zero-emission standards be set for all
sources of a nonthreshold pollutant,"' regardless of technological feasi-
bility and the size or affordability of compliance costs. The nondiscre-
tionary duty is enforceable in the courts by citizen suits,1 12 which provide
environmental organizations a powerful enforcement tool. The regula-
tory significance of the initial listing decision is enhanced by the difficulty
of delisting a pollutant-for delisting requires a showing that a pollutant
is "clearly" not hazardous. 113 Indeed, because it is practically impossible
to prove the negative-to show that a pollutant is "clearly" not hazard-
ous-it is doubtful that the EPA could ever delist a pollutant.
In light of the regulatory implications of the listing decision, the
EPA has been extremely careful to study a pollutant extensively before
listing it. Unfortunately, the statute and its legislative history provide no
guidance concerning what types of scientific data are required to support
a decision to list. While the listing action is a discretionary matter," t4 the
EPA has nonetheless created a time-consuming and cumbersome process
for making the initial decision. A pollutant can become a candidate for
listing either by citizen petition or by internal agency initiative, but it is
not listed until a comprehensive health assessment document is prepared
by the EPA staff, written approval is obtained from the agency's Scien-
tific Advisory Board (SAB), 115 and final approval is granted by the EPA
110. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1982).
111. If a pollutant has no exposure threshold any nonzero dose of the pollutant is associated
with some incremental risk of health damage. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
112. Section 304(a) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 authorizes "citizen suits" against
the EPA Administrator for failure to perform "any act or duty under this Act which is not discre-
tionary with the Administrator." 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1982). For a general discussion of the
merits of this provision, see text and references in R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND POLICY 547-48, 642-43 (2d ed. 1978).
113. Environmentalists have contended that the delisting action should impose on industry "a
heavy burden of proof," especially in the case of carcinogenic pollutants that may cause disease in
some people at all ambient exposure levels. See, eg., D. Doniger & A. Ahmed, supra note 69, at 21.
114. One commentator has suggested that section 112 be amended to authorize citizen suits for
discretionary duties, such as the listing decision. Ferguson, Direct Federal Controls: New Source
Performance Standards and Hazardous Emissions, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 645, 658-59 (1975). This propo-
sal is problematic because a court may have little or no evidentiary record to review in cases in which
citizens sue to compel a listing. See generally Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d
1031, 1045-47 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (court review less appropriate where record is nonexistent or incom-
plete). The proposal would also be an intrusion on the priority-setting freedom of the EPA. Courts
are generally reluctant to intrude on internal agency management decisions such as whether and
when to list a particular pollutant. Cf Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 644 n.49 (1980) (OSHA's priority-setting decisions may be immune from judicial review).
115. On the SAB's role in reviewing health assessment documents, see GAO REPORT ON SEC-
TION 112, supra note 14, at 28; see also infra note 137.
Vol. 1985:100]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1985:100
Administrator.11 6
The EPA estimates that it takes from one to two years to draft a
health assessment document and another three to six months to obtain
SAB review."17 As of June, 1983, the EPA had initiated health assess-
ment documents for nineteen of the thirty-seven "priority" pollutants. 1 8
Written approval from the SAB had been obtained for only two of these
documents,1 19 although the review process was accelerated somewhat
during the tenure of Administrator Ruckelshaus. 120
Unlike the early listing decisions made regarding asbestos, beryl-
lium, and mercury, current EPA practice requires more than a qualita-
tive determination that a pollutant meets the statutory definition of
hazardousness.12 1 In light of the important consequences of the listing
decision, the lack of direction from Congress, and the likely opposition
from affected industries, the EPA has attempted to protect itself from
judicial reversal by including progressively more sophisticated and com-
prehensive analyses in its health assessment documentation. 122 Docu-
ments are now expected to contain an assessment of the degree of health
risk posed by the pollutant at various exposure levels.' 23 Methods of
quantitative risk assessment for cancer are extremely controversial, 24 so
116. A five-step process is used for listings: (1) the EPA's Office of Air Quality Planning and
Standards (OAQPS) identifies a pollutant; (2) the EPA's Office of Health and Environmental Assess-
ment (OHEA) prepares a health assessment document; (3) the OAQPS initiates an exposure assess-
ment for the pollutant; (4) the SAB reviews the health assessment document; and (5) the OAQPS
makes listing recommendation to the EPA Administrator. GAO REPORT ON SECTION 112, supra
note 14, at 3-4.
117. EPA estimates reported in id. at iii, 14.
118. Id. at 15.
119. Id.
120. During 1983, seven health assessment documents were cleared by the SAB. 1983 Hearings,
supra note 15, at 63 (statement of William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, EPA). On specific pollu-
tants, see Advisory Group Says Carbon Tetrachloride Builds Up in 'Air, Probably Causes Cancer, 14
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 102 (Apr. 20, 1984) (written SAB approval of document on carbon tetrachlo-
ride); Advisory Board Accepts Health Report Saying Manganese Causes Chronic Poisoning, 14 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 1394 (Dec. 2, 1983) (SAB approval of manganese report); Toluene, Coke Emissions
Listing Decisions Near Final EPA Scrutiny; Groups Hit Inaction, 14 ENV'T REP. (BiNA) 1390-91
(Dec. 2, 1983) (SAD approval of documents for coke oven emissions and toluene).
121. The listings of asbestos, beryllium, and mercury were based on four factors: the severity of
the health effects, the length of time between exposure and disease, the fraction of total human
exposure attributable to air pollution, and reported cases of disease linked to the pollutants. Quanti-
tative risk assessment did not play an important role. See Tabler, EPA's Program for Establishing
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 34 J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL A. 532,
533-34 (1984).
122. GAO REPORT ON SECTION 112, supra note 14, at 17. The cost of producing each of these
documents is estimated to range from $68,000 to $320,000. Id. at 23-24.
123. Id. at 19-20.
124. See, eg., OFFCE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGIES FOR DETERMINING
CANCER RISKS FROM THE ENVIRONMENT, 157-74 (1981) [hereinafter cited as OTA CANCER RE-
PORT]; Leape, Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation of Environmental Carcinogens, 4 HARV.
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one can see why the health assessment documents often generate lengthy
debates. The issues that regularly stimulate debate include the extent to
which human cancer risk may be inferred from and quantified according
to analyses of animal data, and how health effects observed at high
doses-possibly from animal tests or occupational exposures-should be
extrapolated to ambient concentrations.
The amount of scientific detail contained in the documents has been
enlarged further by the Agency's policy of evaluating all health effects of
a pollutant, not just cancers, before making a listing decision. Beginning
in 1977, EPA health assessment documents evaluated all health effects of
the pollutant in question. 125 In 1979, however, the EPA's proposed "ge-
neric" cancer policy called for the documents to emphasize carcinogenic
effects. 126 That policy was reversed early in 1981, when the EPA re-
turned to full-scale health assessments. 127 One problem with the full-
scale approach is that it consumes limited agency resources and delays
listing of a pollutant, even though the carcinogenic effects may have been
established. Since carcinogenic pollutants are generally assumed by the
EPA to have no exposure thresholds,1 28 the justification for stringent reg-
ulation of toxic air pollutants can often be based on carcinogenic effects
alone. In these cases, an analysis of noncarcinogenic effects is arguably a
waste of the Agency's limited scientific resources. Only if evidence of
carcinogenicity is weak do other potential health effects require
evaluation.
Qualitative evaluation of carcinogenicity data also raises complex
and controversial issues. For example, what relative weights should be
given to positive and negative findings from epidemiological, animal, and
mutagenicity studies? The Agency attempted, in its proposed generic
cancer policy, to standardize the treatment of different types of scientific
data.129 Although the proposed cancer policy was never finalized, the
Agency did endorse the carcinogenicity guidelines contained in a draft
ENVTL. L. REv. 86, 86-89 (1980); Whittemore, Mathematical Models of Cancer and Their Use in
Risk Assessment, J. ENvTL. PATHOLOGY & ToxicoLoGy, Dec. 1979, at 353, 360-61; Whittemore,
Facts and Values in Risk Analysis for Environmental Toxicants, 3 RISK ANALYSIS 25, 31-32 (1983).
125. GAO REPORT ON SEcTION 112, supra note 14, at 19-20.
126. See Proposed Cancer Policy, 44 Fed. Reg. 58,642 (1979) (proposed Oct. 10, 1979).
127. GAO REPORT ON SEcTION 112, supra note 14, at 19-20.
128. See Interim Procedures and Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,402-03 (1976) (summary of interim
procedures and guidelines for cancer risk assessment, where EPA endorses nonthreshold view).
129. Proposed Rulemaking, 44 Fed. Reg. 58,642, 58,646-47 (1979) (evaluation of the probability
of human carcinogenicity based on quality and weight of evidence; "best evidence" is positive epide-
miological data with confirmatory animal tests; "substantial evidence" is provided by positive animal
tests in one or more species; "suggestive evidence" includes positive mutagenicity and other factors)
(proposed Oct. 10, 1979).
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report by the Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG).1 30 Unfor-
tunately, the Group's report 131 is controversial because it never incorpo-
rated comments from the public. 132 In any event, the Agency's
endorsement of the document probably carries no legal significance.
1 33
The Office of Science and Technology Policy is currently completing an-
other generic cancer policy document that may influence the carcinoge-
nicity determinations made by the EPA.134 For the most part, the EPA
and the SAB are compelled to assess carcinogenicity data on a pollutant-
by-pollutant basis, without the guidance of statutory or agency policy.
As the analytical sophistication of the health assessment document
has grown, so has the amount and intensity of peer review. Authors of
the documents-EPA staff or contractors-are expected to present drafts
to open peer review workshops attended by scientists inside and outside
130. The IRLG was formed in the Carter Administration by the heads of the EPA, the FDA,
the OSHA, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission. See generally M. Gerteis & S. Thomas,
The Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group (Dec. 10, 1983) (unpublished draft, copy on file with
author); Interagency Agreement, 42 Fed. Reg. 54,856 (1977) (IRLG agreement to cooperate on
regulation of toxic substances); Interagency Work Plan, 43 Fed. Reg. 7174-78 (1978) (IRLG work
plan on risk assessment).
131. Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group, Work Group on Risk Assessment, Scientific Bases
for Identification of Potential Carcinogens and Estimation of Risks, 63 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 241
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Draft IRLG Report].
132. The Federal Register notice states that the authors "anticipate publishing a statement giving
notice of whatever revisions to the document are appropriate, if any." Request for Public Comment,
44 Fed. Reg. 39,858 (1979). Despite receipt of extensive comments, no revisions were published.
The lack of adequate peer review of the IRLG document has been a source of controversy in con-
gressional hearings. See, eg., Control of Carcinogens in the Environment: Hearings Before the Sub.
comm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 69-79 (1983) (statement of Dr. Norton Nelson, New York University Medical
Center) (under questioning from Rep. Don Ritter, R-Pa., Dr. Nelson admitted that the IRLG report
should have been subjected to extensive, formal external review).
133. In contrast to OSHA's generic cancer policy, 45 Fed. Reg. 5002 (codified at 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1990.101-.152 (1984)) (proposed Jan. 22, 1980), the IRLG guidelines were never officially
promulgated as regulations by the participating agencies. Nor has the EPA officially adopted the
IRLG guidelines as agency policy. The Federal Register notice accompanying the draft IRLG re-
port states that "the report does not have any regulatory status at this time other than as a valuable
scientific appraisal of scientific principles applicable to identifying and evaluating potential human
carcinogens." Request for Public Comment, 44 Fed. Reg. 39,858 (1979). Instead, the EPA contin-
ues to abide by the "interim" cancer policy principles adopted by Administrator Train in 1976. See
Interim Procedures and Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,402 (1976). A contrary view is that agencies
participating in the IRLG are required to acknowledge and justify any departures from the guide-
lines contained in the draft IRLG report. See Ashford, Ryan & Caldert, A Hard Look at Federal
Regulation of Formaldehyde". A Departure from Reasoned Decisionmaking, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REv. 297, 300-03, 316 (1983) (arguing that the "reasoned decisionmaking" doctrine created by fed-
eral courts pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act compels agencies to explain departures
from IRLG document). But see J. Graham, Reasoned Decisionmaking, Formaldehyde, and Federal
Cancer Policy: A Different View (Oct. 1984) (unpublished draft, available from author) (disputing
the Ashford, Ryan, and Caldert interpretation of "reasoned decisionmaking" doctrine).
134. Notice of Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,594 (1984) (proposed Office of Science and Technol-
ogy Policy cancer guidelines).
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of the EPA.1 35 The results of these reviews are supposed to be incorpo-
rated into the documents before subsequent reviews by high-level agency
staff and the SAB. 136 Review of the documents by the SAB has been an
integral part of the listing process since 1978.137 Although section 117(c)
of the Act directs the EPA Administrator to consult with appropriate
advisory committees, 138 it is the EPA's policy to delay listing and regula-
tory decisions until SAB approval of the health assessment document has
been obtained. 139 Aside from the administrative costs and delay associ-
ated with such intensive scientific review, there is a danger that the pre-
cautionary intent of the listing process will be sacrificed in the pursuit of
scientific respectability. The elaborate review process conveys the im-
pression that a listing decision must be based on scientific consensus or
conclusive scientific evidence. Such strict scientific review may conflict
with the precautionary intent of the Act.
Two types of errors can be made in the listing decision. A "false-
negative" error means that a truly carcinogenic pollutant is not listed due
to inconclusive scientific data. A "false-positive" error means that a
truly noncarcinogenic pollutant is listed due to misinterpretation of
available scientific data. Both types of error are costly to society. False-
positive listings cause unwarranted regulatory costs to be imposed on the
private sector and limited agency resources to be diverted from the regu-
lation of truly carcinogenic pollutants. False-negative listing decisions
result in uncontrolled emissions of a carcinogenic substance and the crea-
tion of a false sense of safety about the pollutant in question. In light of
the different consequences associated with the two types of error, the list-
ing action should be viewed as a policy decision to be informed by scien-
tific data, but not controlled by concepts of scientific consensus or proof.
The plain language and legislative history of section 112 indicate
that Congress was particularly concerned about the failure to list a truly
hazardous pollutant. The definition of hazardousness-applying to what
"may reasonably be anticipated to result" in increased illness or mortal-
ity 1'4-is highly precautionary and the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments
emphasize the precautionary and preventive purposes of section 112 and
135. GAO REPORT ON SECTION 112, supra note 14, at 15.
136. Id.
137. The Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) is a group of independent scientists appointed and
paid by the EPA who review the quality and sufficiency of the scientific data underlying some EPA
decisions, such as section 112 listings. The SAB has standing committees, special committees, and
ad hoc consultants for specific issues. Meetings of the SAB are announced in the Federal Register
and are open to the public. See id. at 3-4, 28-35.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 7417(c) (1982).
139. GAO REPORT ON SECTION 112, supra note 14, at iv.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (1982).
Vol. 1985:100]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
of the Act as a whole.141 While Congress did not intend to transfer the
burden of proof from the EPA to industrial polluters, 142 the legislative
history of the 1977 Amendments reveals a conviction that standards of
health protection should not be delayed due to the absence of conclusive
scientific indications of adverse health effects from pollution. 143 A spe-
cial concern with false-negative errors is particularly justified in the con-
text of section 112, where the pollutants addressed may cause severe
health damage, including various forms of cancer. 144
Although the listing process should be highly precautionary, there
are good reasons to subject EPA listing decisions to some form of in-
dependent scientific review.' 45 Such review can weed out arbitrary list-
ings, stimulate higher quality work by EPA staff, redirect the Agency
toward pollutants with genuine risks of severe health damage, promote
public confidence in the agency's decisionmaking, insulate the Adminis-
trator from political attacks, and possibly reduce the incentive for and
ultimate success of legal challenges both by industry and by environmen-
tal groups. A study by the General Accounting Office found that SAB
review results in substantial improvement in the scientific accuracy of
health assessment documents.146 It should be recognized, however, that
scientific review is not a neutral device in the adversarial process of envi-
ronmental regulation. Layers of scientific review can be exploited by
opponents of regulation to delay the listing process while maintaining
that an ideal of "good science" is being advanced. 147
From this perspective, it is not surprising that industrial groups af-
fected by section 112 propose even more elaborate forms of scientific re-
view of EPA listing decisions. Industrialists have proposed that
carcinogenicity determinations by the federal government-and particu-
larly those made under section 112-be subjected to advisory opinions of
independent scientific panels. 148 Proposals ranging from formal science
141. H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 71, at 51.
142. Id. at 49 (citing Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976)).
143. Id. at 46-51.
144. H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 71, at 50 (emphasizing the more "serious" nature of hazard-
ous air pollutants).
145. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 55-56.
146. GAO REPORT ON SECTION 112, supra note 14, at 28.
147. For example, intensive scientific debate about the health effects of radionuclides has delayed
adoption of the EPA's regulatory proposals for radionuclides. See EPA Science Board Says Scientific
Basis for Radionuclides Decision was Inadequate, 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) at 465-66 (July 27, 1984).
148. See, eg., Health Standards for Air Pollutants: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health
and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 420-23
(1981) (statement of Dr. Fred Hoerger, American Industrial Health Council); see also American
Indus. Health Council, Risk Assessment: Past and Future Proposals to Improve the Science Base
for Regulatory Decisions 25-27 (May 1984) (draft manuscript, copy on file with author).
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courts to ad hoe agency science panels have received extensive discussion
in the scholarly literature. 149 But the case for further scientific review of
the EPA's listing decisions is not a strong one. The current listing pro-
cess appears to be excessively oriented to scientific validity, a problem
that is exacerbated by the requirement that the SAB provide written ap-
proval to all documents before listing decisions are made. 150 A recent
evaluation of the EPA's rulemakings under section 112 found that there
was "a myth of scientific incompetence" about the EPA that leads to
excessive scientific scrutiny of its decisions. 151
B. Unrealistic Rulemaking Deadlines.
Once a pollutant is listed, the EPA must propose emission standards
within six months and final standards within a year. The EPA has con-
sistently failed to meet the timetable for final standards. 152 While it is
always fashionable to criticize bureaucratic delay, it must also be noted
that the legislated deadlines in section 112 are ludicrous. Within the con-
149. See, eg., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 5-8 (1983); Martin, The Proposed Science Court, 75 MICH. L.
REv. 1058 (1977); Ramo, Regulation of TechnologicalActivities: A New Approach, 213 SCIENCE 837,
841-42 (1981); Task Force. of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science
and Technology, The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report, 193 SCIENCE 653 (1976);
Whitney, The Case for Creating a Special Environmental Court System-A Further Comment, 15
WM. & MARY L. REv. 33 (1973); Yellin, Science, Technology, and Administrative Government: In-
stitutional Designsfor Environmental Decisionmaking, 92 YALE L.J. 1300 (1983); Yellin, High Tech-
nology and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for Institutional Reform, 94 HARV. L. REv. 489
(1981).
150. For example, SAB written approval for several pollutants has been delayed because of a
technical disagreement with EPA staff about the proper method for assessing human cancer risk
from animal data. See GAO REPORT ON SECTION 112, supra note 14, at 18.
151. Greenwood, The Myth of Scientific Incompetence of Regulatory Agencies, Sm., TECH. &
HUM. VALUES, Winter 1984, at 83-96.
152. Asbestos, beryllium, and mercury were listed under section 112 on March 31, 1971. Addi-
tion to List of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 36 Fed. Reg. 5931 (1971). Final emission standards for
these pollutants were not promulgated until April 6, 1973. 38 Fed. Reg. 8820 (1973) (codified at 40
C.F.R. §§ 61.32, .52, .147 (1984)). On December 24, 1975, EPA listed vinyl chloride as a hazardous
air pollutant, Addition to List of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 40 Fed. Reg. 59,477 (1975), and pro-
posed emission standards, Initial Proposed Rule, 40 Fed. Reg. 59,532 (1975). Final standards were
issued on October 21, 1976. 41 Fed. Reg. 46,560 (1976) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 61.60-.65 (1984)).
The EPA listed benzene as a hazardous air pollutant on June 8, 1977. Addition to List of Hazardous
Air Pollutants, 42 Fed. Reg. 29,332 (1977). Final emission standards for one of the categories of
benzene emission were issued on June 6, 1984. 49 Fed. Reg. 23,498 (1984) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 61.112 (1984)). Arsenic was listed on October 18, 1979, Addition to List of Hazardous Air Pollu-
tants, 44 Fed. Reg. 60,155 (1979), and radionuclides on December 27, 1979, Addition to List of
Hazardous Air Pollutants, 44 Fed. Reg. 76,738 (1979). As of this writing, final standards for ra-
dionuclides and arsenic have not been promulgated. But see Court Finds Ruckelshaus in Contempt,
Orders EPA to Decide on Radionuclides, [Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1371, 1371
(Dec. 14, 1984) (noting Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, No. C84-0656 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 1985) (con-
tempt order)).
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straints of the resources provided by Congress, it generally takes the
EPA at least two years to propose standards because of the time required
to identify the full range of emission sources, to obtain requisite informa-
tion on compliance technologies and costs, and to generate EPA consen-
sus on a proposed regulatory package. 153 It then takes at least one year
to promulgate final regulations after the proposal because of the time
necessary to obtain, analyze, and respond to public comments, to revise
the proposals accordingly, and to obtain final EPA approval. 154 Some-
time during this process the EPA must also subject the package to review
by the Office of Management and Budget.155 The timetable described
above is achievable only if the EPA continues the often-criticized prac-
tices of making extensive use of outside consultants and external
contracts. 156
When Congress establishes unrealistic deadlines for the discharge of
nondiscretionary duties, it invites disruptive litigation. The recent court
orders regarding benzene,157 radionuclides, 158 and arsenic159 have accel-
erated regulatory analysis of these pollutants by indirectly bringing about
a shift of EPA resources from other projects. The recent General Ac-
counting Office study of the EPA's air toxics program describes the fol-
lowing consequences of the court orders: additional delays in the
development of health assessment documents for unlisted pollutants, new
delays in the Agency's review of emission standards now in effect for
listed pollutants, and substantial setbacks in the development of several
new source performance standards for pollutants under section 111 of
the Clean Air Act. 160
The disruptions caused by recent lawsuits could also have a perverse
effect on EPA behavior-the Agency may delay listing pollutants in the
future until proposed emission standards are ready for publication. In
fact, delay in the listing of vinyl chloride from May, 1974, until Decem-
ber, 1975, has been attributed to the EPA's desire to avoid the statutory
rulemaking deadlines in section 112.161 Recent lawsuits have encouraged
153. GAO REPORT ON SECTION 112, supra note 14, at 39; see also Tabler, supra note 121, at
535-36.
154. GAO REPORT ON SECTION 112, supra note 14, at 39.
155. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1982) (requiring that all major rules be sub-
jected to cost-benefit analysis).
156. GAO REPORT ON SECTION 112, supra note 14, at 24.
157. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, No. 83-2011 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 27, 1984).
158. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 551 F. Supp. 785, 786 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
159. New York v. Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
160. GAO REPORT SECTION 112, supra note 14, at 42-43.
161. Doniger, supra note 55, at 587.
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such behavior. 162 It appears that the EPA is currently delaying the list-
ing of known carcinogenic pollutants until emission standards are ready
for formal proposal in the Federal Register.163 Such delay is legally de-
fensible because there is no time limit governing when a pollutant must
be listed under section 112. If the EPA continues to respond in this fash-
ion, then the benefits of a prompt listing decision will be foregone.
Prompt listings are beneficial because they may cause industrial
sources to take some steps to curtail emissions, even in the absence of
emission regulations. For example, benzene emissions from some plants
were lessened substantially from the time of the listing-1977-until the
promulgation of final standards-1984.16 Economic factors were pri-
marily responsible for this decline, but some additional emission control
may be attributable to the prompt listing. In addition, prompt listings
are useful in providing continuity in EPA policy as agency administra-
tors and presidential administrations come and go. Without a prompt
listing, there is no expectation that the Agency's partial work on emis-
sion standards will be proposed or promulgated in a timely fashion. If
arsenic and benzene had not been listed during the Carter Administra-
tion, it is unlikely that the Reagan Administration would have made reg-
ulatory decisions about these known human carcinogens. Effective
implementation of the congressional purpose of section 112 is facilitated
by prompt listing decisions.
One way to accelerate the listing of pollutants under section 112,
sometimes called the "list and hammer" method,16 5 is for Congress to
incorporate a list of pollutants into its legislative mandate to the EPA. A
variant of this approach was used in the 1977 Amendments1 66 and a
more radical version is endorsed by environmentalists in the House and
Senate.1 67 This approach to listing pollutants is a legislative practice of
questionable effectiveness and desirability. Grafting a priority list of
162. See, eg., Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, No. 83-2011 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 27,
1984) (action against EPA for failing to propose control standards after listing benzene as hazard-
ous). Some EPA staff members believe the agency "got burned on benzene;" as a result, formal
listings are being replaced by notices of "intent to regulate." EPA's New Approach to Regulating
Toxics May Delay Decision Process, Dingell Says, [Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2185-
86 (Mar. 30, 1984).
163. GAO REPORT ON SECTION 112, supra note 14, at 42-43.
164. Proposed Withdrawal of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 8386 (1984) (proposed Mar. 6,
1984).
165. American Indus. Health Council, Risk Assessment: Past and Future Proposals to Improve
the Scientific Base for Regulatory Decisions, 38 (May 1984) (unpublished draft; copy on file with
author).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (1982).
167. See 1982 CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 432-33; Plan to Provide for Automatic Listing of Hazardous
Pollutants Introduced in House, 7 CHEMICAL REG. REP. (BNA) No. 51, at 1744 (Mar. 23, 1984).
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thirty-seven pollutants onto section 112 is inadvisable because the priori-
ties should change as new scientific data are gathered. As an expert ad-
ministrative agency with scientific staff, the EPA should be in a better
position than Congress to evaluate the carcinogenic risks of various pol-
lutants and to establish sensible priorities for rulemaking action. Mem-
bers of Congress lack the time, the attention span, and the expertise to
modify priorities in the face of evolving patterns of scientific data. The
EPA recently found that many substances on the original list of thirty-
seven priority pollutants no longer deserve priority assessment. 168 There
is a real danger that forced listings could cause the EPA to lose control of
the priority-setting process, thereby diverting the Agency from a more
productive use of its health-protecting resources. 169 As we shall see, the
EPA's footdragging does not reflect bad motives on the part of agency
personnel; rather, it is caused by the statute itself.
A close look at events subsequent to the 1977 Amendments reveals
that the strategy of forced listings was ineffective and disruptive. Of the
four pollutants specified in the 1977 Amendments, none were listed and
regulated within the legislated time limits. The EPA continues to believe
that cadmium is not hazardous at ambient exposures 170 and that poly-
cylic organic matter per se is not usefully listed and regulated as a haz-
ardous air pollutant. 171 The staff time expended by the EPA on these two
pollutants pursuant to congressional mandate has achieved no discerni-
ble health benefit. Additional agency resources will be expended in the
litigation that is certain to ensue.172 In the case of radionuclides, the
Agency was forced by court order to propose complicated emission stan-
dards before the magnitude of the cancer risks was estimated. Now, after
completing the appropriate analyses, the EPA is withdrawing the pro-
posed standards on grounds of insignificant risk-a decision that presum-
ably will be litigated.173 The listing of arsenic as a hazardous air
168. GAO REPORT ON SECTION 112, supra note 14, at 11-13.
169. See 1983 Hearings, supra note 15, at 9, 11 (statement of Joseph A. Cannon, Assistant Ad-
ministrator for Air and Radiation, EPA) ("The simple fact is, an automatic listing requirement
might make [the EPA] make decisions. . . that are not always in the best interest of the country.").
170. 1981 Hearings, supra note 9, at 743 (statement of Walter Barber, Director, Office of Air
Quality Planning and Standards, EPA) (stating EPA position on cadmium exposure).
171. The state of New York has appealed the EPA's decision not to list polycydlic organic mat-
ter. New York v. Ruckeshaus, No. 84-1472 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 18, 1984). The EPA believes that
a more practical means of regulating polycydlic organic matter is to list particular source categories,
such as coke-oven emissions. See Proposed Decision Not to Regulate, 49 Fed. Reg. 5580, 5582
(1984).
172. See New York, Colorado, NRDC Sue to Force EPA to Regulate Polycyclic Organic Matter,
15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 801, 801-02 (1984).
173. T. Gorman, Risk Management: EPA Experiments With a New Policy 14 (unpublished
manuscript; presented at the Sixth Annual Research Conference of the Association for Public Policy
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pollutant appears to be supportable on scientific grounds, but it is not
clear in some cases what can be done further to reduce emissions, short
of shutting down large industrial facilities. On the whole, the legislative
attempt to force EPA decisionmaking on these four pollutants has had
little beneficial result while it has diverted the EPA's attention and re-
sources from other priority air pollutants and other environmental
projects.174
C. Contentious Assertions of Insignificant Risk
Once a pollutant is listed as hazardous, the EPA must determine
which industries, source categories, and plants emit the pollutant in suffi-
cient quantities to justify imposition of emission standards. The language
of section 112 contains no explicit guidance to inform this process. Envi-
ronmentalists have urged the EPA to establish stringent emission limita-
tions for virtually all sources of the pollutant. 175 Industrialists urge that
exemptions be provided for categories of emission sources that do not
pose a "significant" risk. 176
The EPA has sided with industry, preferring the view that some
categories of hazardous emissions need not be regulated under section
112. The nature of the EPA's process for determining significant emis-
sion sources was revealed in the recent benzene rulemaking. 177 Proposed
emission standards for three source categories were withdrawn by the
EPA in June, 1984, on grounds of insignificant risk.178 The EPA argues
that a margin of safety does not require zero risk and, therefore, source
categories causing sufficiently small risks can be ignored in the standard-
setting process. 179 The EPA estimates, based on quantitative risk assess-
ment, that citizens suffering the highest exposures to benzene from the
three unregulated source categories would incur "excess lifetime risks"180
of leukemia in the 10-4 to 10-5 range. 181 While individual risks of this
Analysis and Management, New Orleans, La., Oct. 18-20, 1984) (EPA "very likely" to be sued on
radionuclides).
174. Id. at 14-15, 17 (discussing the resource tradeoffs that occur when a pollutant is selected for
rulemaking).
175. See, eg., D. Doniger & A. Ahmed, supra note 69, at 8-9.
176. See, eg., 1981 Hearings, supra note 20 at 722-23 (statement of Michael A. James on behalf
of the Chemical Manufacturers Association).
177. Proposed Withdrawal of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 8386 (1984).
178. Withdrawal of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,558 (1984).
179. Proposed Withdrawal of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 8386 (1984).
180. An "excess lifetime risk" is the increased chance-owing to exposure to a given sub-
stance-that one will contract a given disease during one's expected lifetime.
181. Proposed Withdrawal of Proposed Standards, supra note 179, at 8389-91; see also E. Salo,
Decision Memorandum for the Administrator on Benzene 4 (Sept. 7, 1983) (unpublished memoran-
dum by EPA attorney; copy on file with author).
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magnitude are sometimes regulated by the states, the EPA, and other
agencies, 182 the withdrawal notice emphasizes that, on a national basis,
the expected number of leukemia cases attributable to emissions from the
three sources combined is estimated to be considerably less than one per
year.183 The EPA asserts that the decision is consistent with the
Supreme Court's opinion in Industrial Union Department v. American
Petroleum Institute ,184 in which a plurality of the Court argued that the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) must show that
benzene creates a "significant" leukemia risk before OSHA attempts to
reduce the ten-parts-per-million workplace exposure limit.185 Justice Ste-
vens described an excess lifetime risk of death of 10-3 as one that "a
reasonable person might well consider significant and take appropriate
steps to decrease or eliminate." 186 The OSHA is now using the 10-3 cut-
off in its determination of what constitutes a significant risk in terms of
its enabling legislation.18 7
Environmentalists have recently challenged the EPA's withdrawal
decision in federal court.18 8 The NRDC contends that no person should
lose his or her life from air pollution and that the Clean Air Act em-
braces this goal. 189 The nature and severity of the health effects caused
by hazardous air pollution are so serious that the NRDC believes that
judgments of insignificant risk are ethically and legally impermissible.
The definition of a hazardous air pollutant refers to "an increase in mor-
tality," not a "significant" increase in mortality. 190
As a practical matter, the NRDC concedes that the EPA "may have
limited authority to define de minimis rates of emissions and to conclude
182. Some states use an excess lifetime risk of 10-6 as a guideline for acceptable cancer risk. See
States Moving Ahead with Toxics Programs in Absence of Federal Action, Official Says, [Current
Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1371 (Nov. 25, 1983) (states include Illinois, Michigan, New
Jersey, and New York). The EPA, at least under Administrator Gorsuch, tended to take an ambiva-
lent attitude toward lifetime cancer risks of 1 0
-4 to 10- 5 . See J. Todhunter, Review of Data Avail-
able to the Administrator Concerning Formaldehyde 5 (Feb. 10, 1982) (unpublished memorandum
by Assistant Administrator, EPA; copy on file with author). Richard Wilson has urged agencies to
employ such quantitative criteria more extensively as a method for determining what risks are ac-
ceptable. See Wilson, Risks and Their Acceptability, Sci., TECH. & HUM. VALUES, Spring 1984, at
11, 14-22 (1984).
183. Proposed Withdrawal of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 8386, 8389-91 (1984).
184. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
185. Id at 641.
186. Id. at 655.
187. See the discussion of the significant-risk doctrine in OSHA's rulemakings on arsenic, Sup-
plemental Statement of Reasons for Final Rule, 48 Fed. Reg. 1864, 1866-67 (1983) (proposed Jan.
14, 1983), and asbestos, Emergency Temporary Standard, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,086, 51,088-91 (1983).
188. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Thomas, No. 84-1387 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 3,
1984); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, No. 84-1391 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 3, 1984).
189. D. Doniger & A. Ahmed, supra note 69, at 2, 9.
190. Id. at 9,
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that sources emitting at lower rates need not be subject to standards." 19'
The determination of de minimis emission rates would, according to the
NRDC, be based not on quantitative risk assessment, but rather on con-
siderations discussed in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle.192 There, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that most
regulatory statutes, including the Clean Air Act, provide agencies with
inherent authority to ignore "trifling matters."' 193 Alabama Power is un-
fortunately of little value in the context of section 112 because it does not
indicate the limits of the EPA's authority to define what is "trifling."
Underlying the conflict between the EPA and the NRDC is a nor-
mative dispute about the relative importance of individual rights and the
social value of minimizing risks. The EPA gives weight to the argument
that the total number of persons adversely affected by the three unregu-
lated sources of benzene emissions is small. 194 In contrast, the NRDC
approaches environmental protection from a rights-based perspective, as-
serting that each citizen has a right not to be victimized by hazardous air
pollution.195 Both positions have a certain plausibility, and thus a proce-
dure for making significant-risk judgments incorporating both is recom-
mended below. 196
The NRDC and the EPA have also taken conflicting positions on
the reliability and appropriate use of quantitative risk assessment under
section 112. The EPA believes that the assumptions used by the agency's
Carcinogen Assessment Group are "conservative" in the sense that the
predictions of the linear, no-threshold model the Group employs are un-
likely to underestimate the actual cancer incidence attributable to specific
air pollutants. 197 The EPA therefore argues that risk assessment can be
used to distinguish "significant" from "insignificant" source categories,
although the Agency has yet to adopt publicly a numerical cutoff for this
determination. 198
191. Id. at 10 n.3 (emphasis in original). However, Doniger and Ahmed also stated that such
levels "would have to be consistent with the de minimus [sic] emissions levels already established for
the existing hazardous air pollutants." Id.
192. 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
193. Id. at 360-61.
194. Proposed Withdrawal of Proposed Standards, 49 Fed. Reg. 8386, 8389-91 (1984); E. Salo,
supra note 181, at 7.
195. D. Doniger, Remarks on Toxics in the Environment, sponsored by Inside EPA Weekly
Report and The Center for Energy and Envtl. Mgmt. 2 (Nov. 17-18, 1983) (copy on file with author).
196. See infra text accompanying notes 295-308.
197. See, eg., Ruckelshaus, Risk in a Free Society, 14 ENvrL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INsT.) 10,190-
91 (1984) (describing conservatism in EPA risk assessments); see also Proposed Withdrawal of Pro-
posed Standards, Fed. Reg. 8386, 8388 (1984) (EPA describes its Carcinogen Assessment Group's
estimates of benzene-induced leukemia as "reasonable").
198. The Office of Management and Budget has criticized the EPA for not adopting a common
de minimis cutoff risk level for source categories. See OMB Position on Use ofRisk Assessment Cost-
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In contrast, the NRDC believes that the techniques of cancer-risk
assessment are "too uncertain and fragile to be a rational basis" for regu-
latory decisions under section 112.199 The NRDC challenges the
Agency's assumption of "conservatism" by pointing to possibilities of in-
teraction between chemicals or between pollutants and other risk fac-
tors.20° However, the NRDC offers no alternative analytical foundation
for significant-risk decisions. Although the NRDC has suggested that
exemptions of source categories be based on previous agency decisions on
hazardous pollutants,20 1 it is not clear that the exemption decisions for
these pollutants have a rational basis.20 2 The use of quantitative risk as-
sessment is necessary not because it is highly reliable but because there
are no available alternative modes of analysis.20 3
D. Fear of Zero-Emission Standards.
A basic problem with section 112 is the unworkable statutory test
for setting emission standards for nonthreshold pollutants, such as air-
borne carcinogens. The EPA is supposed to set emission standards at the
level that "protects the public health with an ample margin of safety."
However, the scientific community has not established a safe or "no-ef-
fect" level of exposure for any known carcinogen. 2°4 A significant seg-
ment of the scientific community believes, on the basis of certain theories
of carcinogenesis, that any human exposure to a carcinogen, however
small, poses some incremental risk of cancer.205 Under these conditions
it is impossible for the EPA to establish nonzero emission limits for car-
cinogens that protect the public health, let alone provide an ample mar-
gin of safety. The EPA has acknowledged that a literal interpretation of
the Act might require that zero emission limits be established for all non-
Effectivness Analysis, Benefit-Cost Review in Setting Standards for Toxic Air Pollutants, 14 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 1593 (Dec. 8, 1983) [hereinafter cited as OMB Report].
199. D. Doniger & A. Ahmed, supra note 69, at 5.
200. D. Doniger, supra note 195, at 8.
201. D. Doniger & A. Ahmed, supra note 69, at 10 n.3.
202. Indeed, the EPA's exemption of some sources from vinyl chloride regulation was criticized
as inconsistent by the same author who is now proposing that past EPA exemption decisions serve as
the basis for future exemption decisions. Compare id. with Doniger, supra note 55, at 586 n.468.
203. For an extensive analysis supporting this statement, see QUANTrrATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT
1-54 (L. Lave ed. 1982).
204. See, eg., EPA National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Policy and Pro-
cedure for Identifying, Assessing and Regulating Airborne Substances Posing a Risk of Cancer, 44
Fed. Reg. 58,642, 58,642 (1979) (EPA position that carcinogenic thresholds cannot be shown); Draft
1RLG Report, supra note 131, at 264-65.
205. See discussion of dose-response functions in OTA CANCER REPORT, supra note 124, at 157-
65. See also Tabler, supra note 121, at 532.
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threshold pollutants.20 6 That conclusion is not far-fetched because the
original Senate bill in 1970 called for a prohibition of emissions of haz-
ardous air pollutants.20 7 In practice, the EPA has not issued zero-emis-
sion standards. In the two instances in which the EPA has regulated
nonthreshold pollutants-asbestos and vinyl chloride-the Agency has
rejected zero-emission standards in favor of rules based on available tech-
nology.208 The EPA's legal reasoning in these rulemakings has never
been judicially reviewed. As argued below,20 9 there are good reasons to
doubt the soundness of the EPA's legal position.
In any case, the perception that section 112 might require extremely
strict emission limits appears to have had a counterproductive effect-the
EPA has been reluctant to list pollutants and to promulgate emission
standards. The recent General Accounting Office report on the imple-
mentation of section 112, citing interviews with EPA officials, states that
the EPA "has been reluctant to list pollutants as hazardous under section
112 without a reasonable assurance that subsequent regulations would
result in health benefits that are not grossly disproportionate to the costs
of control.12 10 In testimony before Congress, a veteran employee of the
EPA's air quality office pleaded for legislative correction:
While low-cost controls with the potential to reduce emissions and ex-
posure by fifty to ninety percent may be available, it is not clear that
they would meet the statutory test of "ample margin of safety" under
section 112. On the other hand, uncertainty in the health and expo-
sure data make [sic] more stringent and more costly controls less justi-
fiable. The ability to balance the magnitude and uncertainty of health
risk with the cost and impact of control techniques is a prerequisite to
any accelerated decisionmaking under the statute.2 11
Even if the EPA lists a pollutant, the fear of excessively stringent emis-
sion requirements may paralyze or delay the process of setting standards.
For example, the delay between the proposed and final vinyl chloride
standards has been attributed in part to legal uncertainty about the de-
206. See Initial Proposed Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 58,642, 58,645 (1979); see also Air.Act Interpreta-
tion Could Bar Chemicals, Cannon Warns, Urging Changes in Section 112, 14 ENV'T REP. (BNA)
1901-02 (Mar. 2, 1984); Ruckelshaus Defends Reagan on Acid Rain, Says House-Senate Measures
Would Not Work, 14 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 2205 (Apr. 6, 1984) (reading section 112 to require a zero-
emission level).
207. See S. REP. No. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 495-97 (1970).
208. See Final Vinyl Chloride Emission Standards, 41 Fed. Reg. 46,560, 46,562 (codified at 40
C.F.R. §§ 61.60-.71 (1984)) (proposed Oct. 21, 1976); Final Emission Standards for Asbestos, Beryl-
lium, and Mercury, 38 Fed. Reg. 8820, 8820-22 (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.01-.53 (1984)) (pro-
posed Apr. 6, 1973).
209. See infra notes 225-36 and accompanying text.
210. GAO REPORT ON SEcrbON 112, supra note 14, at 43.
211. 1981 Hearings, supra note 9, at 740-41 (statement of Walter Barber, Director, Office of Air
Quality Planning and Standards, EPA).
Vol. 1985:100]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
gree of reduction of emissions that was intended by Congress.212 Diffi-
culty in interpreting the "ample margin of safety" language was
apparently a major impediment to implementation of section 112 during
the Carter Administration.213
Officials of the EPA have been so dismayed by the stringent stan-
dards called for in section 112 that alternative statutory bases for regula-
tion of airborne carcinogens have been actively investigated. 214 A recent
EPA strategy paper proposes that the agency consider regulating air-
borne carcinogens under other sections of the Clean Air Act or under
section 6 of the Toxic Substances Control Act.215 It has also been re-
ported that the EPA is considering the possibility of negotiating state-by-
state regulation of localized airborne carcinogens, instead of making for-
mal listing decisions under section 112.216 The Agency's exploration of
these alternatives is a response to a blunt and inflexible statute.
E. Unauthorized Consideration of Technology and Cost.
The EPA's legal defense of the technology-based approach 217
to standard setting is a remarkable exercise in statutory
(re)interpretation. 21 The Agency begins with the premise that members
of Congress did not have nonthreshold pollutants in mind when section
112 was written.219 The ample-margin-of-safety formula assumes that
some "safe" level of exposure can be demonstrated and that a safety fac-
tor can be applied to the threshold to assure that the public health is
212. See Doniger, supra note 55, at 566 (delay attributed to EPA's reluctance to "flout the literal
meaning of section 112").
213. 1981 Hearings, supra note 9, at 729 (statement of Khristine Hall, Environmental Defense
Fund).
214. Before vinyl chloride was regulated under section 112, other options were actively consid-
ered. The EPA considered using section 115 (abatement conferences, codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7415(d) (1982)), section 303 (imminent hazard emergency powers, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7603(a)
(1982)), and section 109 (a primary ambient air quality standard, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)
(1982)). These options were ultimately rejected, for a variety of reasons, in favor of a listing under
section 112. See Doniger, supra note 55, at 573-75.
215. EPA Staff Draft, Proposed Process for Evaluation and Control of Toxic Air Pollutants 25-
27 (Mar. 23, 1983) (unpublished draft, copy on file with author).
216. See, eg., Aim Said to Approve Plan for Regulation of Acrylonitrile Emissions by State Pro-
grams, 8 CHEMICAL REG. REP. (BNA) No. 10, at 301-02 (June 8, 1984).
217. Under this approach, the stringency of emissions standards is determined by engineering,
rather than health or economic, considerations. See McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and
Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Health and Environmental Regulation, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1983, at 159, 160.
218. The EPA's legal defense was advanced for comment in the proposed generic cancer policy.
See Initial Proposed Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 58,642, 58,659-61 (1979).
219. Id. at 58,659-60. But see Schroeder, supra note 42, at 35 n.l 18 (arguing that Muskie knew
about nonthreshold pollutants).
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protected. 220 If, however, zero exposure is the only safe level, then the
ample-margin-of-safety formula cannot be applied. Because Congress
did not explicitly indicate its intent to create the economic disaster that
zero-emission standard would bring about,221 and because a zero-emis-
sion standard renders the margin-of-safety concept meaningless, the EPA
infers that zero-emission standards for nonthreshold pollutants were not
intended by Congress. 222 From this point, the EPA proceeds to advocate
a technology-based approach to setting emission standards, which calls
for zero emissions only where an unreasonable risk persists after the best
control technologies have been installed by polluters. Residual cancer
risks are "unreasonable" if the EPA determines that the costs of further
emission control are not grossly disproportionate to the marginal health
benefits. 223
One can sympathize with the EPA in this predicament, but that
does not mean that its statutory interpretation is sound. No judicial rul-
ings have been issued on the matter, so it is conceivable that the EPA's
legal strategy will survive.224 Several legal commentators, however, have
220. 44 Fed. Reg. 58,660 (1979).
221. Id. (predicting "massive social dislocations" from zero-emission standards).
222. Id. (Congress "would have spoken with much greater clarity").
223. See eg., id. at 58,650.
224. The survival of the EPA's reading of section 112 may seem somewhat more likely in light of
two recent rulings of the Supreme Court. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984), the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and upheld the EPA's interpre-
tation of the term "stationary source," 40 C.F.R. § 51.18(j)(l)(i),(ii) (1984), as "a permissible con-
struction of the statute [i.e. section 172(b)(6) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, codified at
42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982)] which seeks to accommodate progress in reducing air pollution with
economic growth." Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2793-94. The Court noted, however, that despite the
opacity of the statute its legislative history-although otherwise "unilluminating," id. at 2791-
"plainly disclose[d] that. . . Congress sought to accommodate the conflict between the economic
interest in. . . capital improvements. . . and the environmental interest in improving air quality."
Id. at 2786. The language of section 112 is therefore distinguishable from that at issue in Chevron,
for the legislative history of section 112 is both illuminating and clearly hostile to agency balancing
of economic interests. See supra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
In Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 53 U.S.L.W. 4193 (U.S. Feb.
27, 1985) (5-4 decision), the Court upheld the EPA's reading of the term "may not modify" as it
occurs in section 301(l) of the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977, codified at 33 U.S.C. 1311(1)
(1982). The EPA reading left the Agency free to issue "fundamentally different factor" (FDF) vari-
ances-see 40 C.F.R. §405.13 (1984)-for specific sources of pollutants listed as toxic by the
Agency. A divided Court held that such variances were not contrary to Congress' directive to the
agency not to "modify" standards for toxic pollutants listed by the Agency. Chemical Mfrs. at 4198.
The structure of the Clean Air Act fundamentally differs from that of the Clean Water Act, how-
ever. In drafting the Clean Water Act, Congress considered the economic impact on industry of
regulating toxic effluents. See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) (1982) (effluent limitation of toxics to be based
on best available technology economically achievable). The EPA, relying on this statutory basis,
promulgated the FDF variance mechanism, which allowed for consideration of economic factors as
they apply to a specific polluter. 40 C.F.R. § 403.13(c)(2)(C) (1984). In drafting section 112 of the
Clean Air Act, however, Congress was not concerned with any type of cost/benefit analysis. See
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denounced and ridiculed the EPA's reading of the statute. 225 In short,
the EPA has attempted to convert section 112 from a health-based stat-
ute to a technology-based statute. Some observers believe that the Ruck-
elshaus EPA moved toward some form of cost-benefit analysis.
226
The Agency's departure from health-based emission standards is
highly questionable in light of the plain language of the section, the legis-
lative history, other sections of the Clean Air Act, and parallel case law.
The plain language of section 112 does not qualify the EPA's duty to
provide an ample margin of safety to protect the public health. There is
no explicit authorization for the EPA to incorporate economic and tech-
nological data into the process of setting emission standards.
The Clean Air Act as a whole carefully distinguishes between health
standards and technology standards. Section 109, which also uses the
language "adequate margin of safety," calls for primary ambient air qual-
ity standards based solely on health considerations.227 Section 111, in
contrast, explicitly authorizes the EPA to consider economic and techno-
logical feasibility when setting emission performance standards for new
stationary sources.228 If Congress had intended the EPA to consider
technology and costs under section 112, it is hard to imagine why that
intention was not made clear, as it was in section 111. The District of
Columbia Circuit has, in fact, noted this distinction:
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. . .distinguish between pol-
lutants subject to technology-based regulation under section 111, and
hazardous substances subject to health-based regulation under section
112. Recognizing that "certain pollutants" required special treatment
because of risk to health, Congress enacted section 112 dealing with
hazardous pollutants, without provision for considerations of
infra notes 225-36 and accompanying text. Therefore, there appears to be no statutory basis on
which the EPA could rely in promulgating an analogue to the FDF variance mechanism to allow
cost/benefit analysis.
225. See 1983 Hearings, supra note 15 at 10 (statement of Joseph A. Cannon, Assistant Admin-
istrator for Air and Radiation, EPA) ("candid" statement concedes that some would argue that
EPA has made a "pretzel" out of section 112); see also GAO REPORT ON SECTION 112, supra note
14, at 44, 51 (finds "little support for EPA's [legal] position;" agency's interpretation "appears at
odds with section 112"); Currie, Direct Federal Regulation of Stationary Sources Under the Clean Air
Act, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1389, 1460-63 (1980) (generally disputing EPA's interpretation of the
standard-setting criteria in section 112); Doniger, supra note 55, at 566-88; Schroeder, supra note 42,
at 1, 30-36 ("EPA rewrote the statute;" statutory interpretation is "totally unjustified;" "flatly con-
tradicts" the rights-based intent of the statute; an "unusually untenable set of positions;" "textually
implausible;" "EPA's idea gives the agency a roving commission to be 'reasonable' ").
226. T. Gorman, supra note 173, at 1, 4-5, 9, 18 (describing the Ruckelshaus EPA's tentative
transition to cost-benefit balancing under section 112).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1982).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 741 1(a)(1) (1982).
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feasibility. 22 9
A good case can be made that emission standards under section 112
are intended to be even more stringently protective of public health than
the primary ambient standards for criteria pollutants in section 109. The
phrase "margin of safety" contained in both sections "was intended to
provide protection against hazards which research has not yet identi-
fied."' 230 While section 109 calls for an "adequate" margin of safety, sec-
tion 112 calls for an "ample" margin of safety.231 One judicial opinion
suggests that an "ample" margin of safety is greater than an "adequate"
margin of safety.232 This conclusion is sensible because hazardous pollu-
tants are expected to cause severer health effects than those caused by
criteria pollutants.
One might read some flexibility into the phrases "in the judgment of
the Administrator" and "to protect the public health," as they occur in
the Act,233 but it is hard to see how an authorization to rely on economic
or technological factors could reasonably be derived from this language.
In a variety of contexts, courts have found that when Congress wants an
agency to consider economic and technological data, it does so expressly
in the language of the Act.234 Moreover, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit has expressly rejected suggestions that nonhealth factors should be
permitted to influence the EPA's setting of primary ambient standards
under section 109235 or the setting of discharge limits of toxic water pol-
lutants under the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of
1972.236
The EPA's rejection of zero-emission standards is based on a defen-
sible view of what is good social policy. While zero-emission standards
229. Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1978). But see Initial Proposed Rule, 44
Fed. Reg. 58,642, 58,661 n.32 (1979) (EPA arguing that this case is not "controlling precedent" for
section 112).
230. Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (quoting S. REP.
No. 1496, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970)).
231. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)(1982) with 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1982).
232. Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1978). But see Initial
Proposed Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 58,642, 58,661 (1979) (Congress did not intend "to make air pollution
practically the sole facet of American life from which the government would attempt to eliminate
risk entirely.").
233. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (1982).
234. See, eg., American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510-11 (1981); Union
Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256-57 (1976); American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176,
1185 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
235. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
236. Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (section 112 of the
Clean Air Amendments of 1970 "bears a marked resemblance" to the toxics provision-section
307(a)-of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, codified as amended at
33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1982)).
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assure fewer emissions than technology-oriented standards, the EPA is
concerned that the drastic economic consequences of zero-emission rules
will not generally justify standards stricter than the best available tech-
nology.237 The EPA, however, is not Congress, and Congress appears to
have embraced a different view of what is good social policy. Senator
Muskie characterized the mandate of section 112 as follows: "The stan-
dards must be set to provide an ample margin of safety to protect the
public health. This could mean effectively, that a plant would be re-
quired to close because of the absence of control techniques. It could
include emission standards which allowed for no measurable
emissions. ' '238
While Congress did not explicitly consider the regulation of carcino-
gens, 239 it did consider the possible necessity of standards so stringent
that polluters would have to shut down. As David Doniger has ex-
plained, "in 1970, at least, Congress apparently found this an acceptable
price to pay for safety.' ' 240 In light of the rather clear legislative intent of
section 112, it would seem that the EPA has indeed "taken excessive
liberties; the difference between health standards and technology stan-
dards is too obvious to be explained away as accidental."' 241
If the EPA is correct in saying that Congress did not contemplate
regulation of nonthreshold pollutants under section 112, then the proper
conclusion is that the EPA lacks the authority to regulate carcinogens
under section 112.242 If that is the case, Congress should either draft a
new provision for carcinogens or amend section 112 to add such power,
including explicit statutory criteria concerning how stringently non-
threshold pollutants are to be regulated. Instead of drawing this infer-
ence, the EPA has manufactured a technology-based criterion for
carcinogens that has "no textual warrant. '243
Both Congress and the environmentalists appear to have acquiesced
237. Initial Proposed Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 58,642, 58,660-61 (1979).
238. 116 CONG. REc. 42,385 (1970) (from summary of Conference Report prepared by Sen.
Muskie). But see Initial Proposed Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 58,642, 58,660 (1979) (EPA discounts Muskie
statement as part of only a "brief consideration" given by Congress to the subject of plant closings).
239. See Initial Proposed Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 58,642, 58,660 (1979) (this point emphasized by
EPA).
240. Doniger, supra note 55, at 585.
241. Currie, supra note 225, at 1389, 1461 (1980).
242. This line of argument originates with Schroeder, supra note 42, at 33-34 n.1 17. The conclu-
sion is strengthened by the fact that Congress envisioned only "a limited number" of pollutants
regulated under section 112. See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1970). To adopt the
EPA's line of reasoning, if Congress had intended section 112 to cover dozens of airborne carcino-
gens, it could have spoken with "more clarity."
243. Schroeder, supra note 42, at 34.
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in the EPA's rewriting of section 112.244 Congress could easily have
amended the criteria for emission standards when drafting the 1977
Amendments, but did not do So.245 While some environmentalists have
expressed the view that section 112 requires zero emissions for carcino-
gens,246 environmental groups have not yet pressed this view in litigation
against the EPA.247 The brittle alliance between the EPA and environ-
mental groups may be broken by the benzene rulemaking.248 Officials of
the EPA are openly predicting a lawsuit challenging the Agency's read-
ing of section 112 249 and they are clearly not confident about the pros-
pects for victory.250 If the federal courts, Congress, and
environmentalists were quietly to ignore the EPA's indiscretion, it would
be a frightening example of administrative government. It is Congress,
not these other parties, that should be responsible and accountable for
deciding how the EPA weighs costs and health benefits when writing
standards for hazardous air pollutants. 251
244. One commentator predicts that the courts will join Congress and the environmentalists in
accepting the EPA's role as rewriter of section 112. He believes that the rights theory underlying the
Clean Air Act has already been "dismissed." Id. at 30.
245. Although Congress did amend section 112 in the 1977 Amendments, see Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 110, 91 Stat. 685, 703 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(e)(1982)), it did not revise the health orientation of emission standards. See generally
Doniger, supra note 55, at 567 n.360, 569 n.362.
246. See, eg., Doniger, supra note 55, at 571; see also 1981 Hearings, supra note 20, at 710
(statement of Khristine Hall, Environmental Defense Fund).
247. Consider the following excerpt from congressional testimony:
Mr. Waxman: Do you think that the present language of the Clean Air Act requiring
emission standards with an ample margin of safety requires zero emission standards?
Mr. Doniger: No, not always. It has never been interpreted in that way and none of the
public health or environmental organizations has sought to press it that far.
1981 Hearings, supra note 9, at 725.
248. Litigation of the benzene standard might force the judiciary to address what section 112
means in the context of nonthreshold carcinogens.
249. 1983 Hearings, supra note 15, at 10 (statement of Joseph A. Cannon, Assistant Administra-
tor for Air and Radiation, EPA) (commenting that the agency has not yet had a judicial ruling on its
legal interpretation of section 112 but "we expect one relatively soon").
250. Statement of William Ruckelshaus, EPA Administrator, at Executive Session on Risk Man-
agement, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. (Mar. 21,
1984) (author in attendance) (Ruckelshaus expressed fear that a federal judge could easily interpret
section 112 as requiring zero emissions in the case of carcinogens).
251. For concurring views, see GAO REPORT ON SECTION 112, supra note 14, at 53; Doniger,
supra note 55, at 585, 588 n.465 (noting that environmental groups have few incentives to use limited
resources to uphold such "governmental process" values); cf. Schroeder, supra note 42, at 36 (noting
conflict between environmentalists and EPA over EPA's construction of section 112). One can also
find support for this view of the American constitutional system in the Supreme Court's decision on
the snail darter, Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978), in which the Court
noted that:
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously
selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. . . . In
our constitutional system the commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental
for us to pre-empt congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with "com-
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F. The Inefficiency of BAT
The EPA has embraced the concept of the "best available technol-
ogy" (BAT) as an approach to setting emission standards for airborne
carcinogens under section 112. Once a pollutant is listed as hazardous,
the EPA plans to require BAT for all categories of stationary sources
that emit "significant" quantities of the pollutant in question. 25 2 Setting
aside the fact that BAT may be a legally impermissible basis for standard
setting, it is useful to evaluate the economic effects of the BAT approach
to emission control. Two recent studies have assessed the economic effi-
ciency of the BAT approach in the context of section 112. An Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) analysis investigated the EPA's pro-
posed emission standards for radionuclides and inorganic arsenic.25 3 An
independent analysis by economists at Harvard's Kennedy School of
Government assessed BAT as an approach to regulation of benzene, ac-
rylonitrile, and coke-oven emissions.254
The OMB analysis found that the uniform BAT approach to stan-
dard setting could reduce the expected incidence of cancer for the two
pollutants by an estimated 4.06 cases per year at an annual total cost of
$27.1 million, or an average cost of $6.7 million per case of cancer
avoided.255 An alternative strategy that concentrates on reducing emis-
sions where population density is high and compliance costs are modest
could lessen cancer incidence by 3.92 cases annually at an annual total
cost of $7.4 million, or $2.1 million per case of cancer avoided.25 6 When
the BAT approach is added to the alternative strategy, only 0.13 ex-
pected cases of cancer are averted at a cost of $19.7 million, or the
equivalent of about $150 million per case of cancer avoided. 257 Under
the BAT approach, the public health gains per dollar of expenditure vary
across sources by a factor of two thousand. 258 A similar demonstration
of economic inefficiency is contained in the Harvard study; the investiga-
tors conclude that "uniform technology-based controls will have vastly
different net benefits depending upon the pollutant and the source cate-
gory; the implicit cost per life saved of BAT standards varies by more
mon sense and the public weal." Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the polit-
ical branches.
252. EPA Staff Draft, supra note 215, at 23-24.
253. OMB Report, supra note 198, at 1593-603.
254. Haigh, Harrison & Nichols, Benefits Assessment and Environmental Regulation: Case Stud-
ies of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 395 (1983).
255. OMB Report, supra note 198, at 1593.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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than a factor of one hundred for the three pollutants. ' 259 Alternative
standards with greater sensitivity to population density and compliance
costs can be more cost-effective than the uniform BAT approach.
The results of the two studies must be qualified in several important
respects. The quantitative results are not as precise as they may appear
because they are based on highly uncertain models of quantitative risk
assessment. The estimates are based on crude emissions data, simplistic
dispersion and exposure models, linear dose-response curves, and cost
data from secondary sources.260 It is possible that the cost-effectiveness
estimates are too high or too low by at least a factor of ten. These esti-
mates are likely to misestimate actual health benefits, 261 but the degree to
which they do so is not certain. The studies do not estimate, for exam-
ple, the extent of non-cancer-related health benefits-if any-or the ex-
tent of carcinogenic synergism with other pollutants, diet, or lifestyle
factors. Moreover, the costs of environmental rules are often overesti-
mated,262 though that may not be an inherent problem. 263
Even if none of these uncertainties existed, the policy implications of
the cost-effectiveness estimates would still be unclear because economists
have not produced reliable estimates of the public's willingness to pay for
reductions in the cancer rate.26 Some studies suggest that society as a
whole is willing to pay $300,000 to $3 million to avert an accident fatal-
ity,265 but it is not clear whether this range is applicable to prevention of
a cancer fatality.26 6 Moreover, some people do not accept the ethical
259. D. Harrison, Case Studies of Hazardous Air Pollutants 11 (1984) (unpublished paper pre-
pared for Executive Session on Risk Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University; copy on file with author); see also Haigh, Harrison & Nichols, supra note 254,
at 411-13.
260. See Haigh, Harrison & Nichols supra note 254, at 418-30 (useful discussion of the uncer-
tainties associated with each of these factors).
261. Id. at 23, 54-55.
262. See Ashford, Alternatives to Cost-Benefit Analysis in Regulatory Decisions, in MANAGE-
MENT OF ASSESSED RISK FOR CARCINOGENS 129, 130-31 (Annals of the N.Y. Academy of Sciences
Vol. 363, 1981).
263. See Crandall, The Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Regulatory Decisionmaking, in MANAGE-
MENT OF ASSESSED RISK FOR CARCINOGENS 99, 102 (Annals of the N.Y. Academy of Sciences Vol.
363, 1981) (analysis of data gathered from regulated firms can guard against overestimates of costs).
264. In cost-benefit analysis, the appropriate monetary value of a lifesaving program is the total
amount of money society is willing to pay for the lifesaving effects of the program. See generally M.
BAILEY, REDUCING RISKS TO LIFE 30-35 (1980).
265. See id. at 35-45; Blomquist, The Value of Human Life: An Empirical Perspective, 19 ECON.
INQUIRY 157, 158-60 (1981); Smith, Compensating Wage Differentials and Public Policy: A Review,
32 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 339-50 (1979).
266. The public may be willing to pay more to prevent accidents than cancers because accident
victims are, on the average, younger, more productive citizens with more dependents. On the other
hand, cancer is an especially painful and demoralizing way to die. On these difficult comparisons see
Vaupel, Early Death: An American Tragedy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1976, at 73, 90-
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foundations of cost-benefit comparisons. They argue that each citizen
has an unqualified right not to be victimized by hazardous air pollution,
regardless of the degree of health risk or the amount of compliance
costs. 267 I do not share that view, but it seems that some protection
should be provided for residents living close to a plant who incur large
individual cancer risks, even if such protection cannot be justified on
cost-benefit grounds. A dual cost-benefit and individual-equity approach
is advocated below2 68 as a modification of the uniform BAT approach.
It turns out that BAT is a highly subjective concept. In theory, the
"marginal balancing analysis" that takes place with cost-benefit compari-
sons is "foreign" to the technology-based approach.269 But, as it is actu-
ally applied, BAT is inevitably chosen with implicit cost-benefit
considerations. There is never really a "best" available technology; there
are only progressively more stringent and expensive abatement meth-
ods.270 In the vinyl chloride rulemaking under section 112, the EPA de-
termined that a technology was not "best" if the marginal costs of the
technology were "grossly disproportionate" to the marginal gains in
emission control.271 This formulation does not entail a strict cost-benefit
analysis, but it clearly is different from the exclusively health-based ap-
proach to emission control contemplated in the plain language of section
112. Under Administrator Ruckelshaus, there were signs of increased
use of cost-effectiveness analysis instead of the BAT approach. 272
G. The Narrow Statutory Approach to Emission Control.
In principle, a variety of approaches can be used by government to
accomplish any given degree of air pollution control. These approaches
include ambient air quality standards, quantitative emission standards,
technology requirements, controls of work practices, emission fees or
taxes, and alienable rights to pollute. A growing technical literature in
environmental policy suggests that the proper choice of control strategy
116; see also Mendelofi, Measuring Elusive Benefits: On the Value of Health, 8 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y & L. 554 (1983).
267. See, eg., Ashford, Alternatives to Cost-Benefit Analysis in Regulatory Decisions, 14 ENVTL.
L. REP. (EN VTL. L. INST.) 132-35 (1984); Doniger, The Gospel of Risk Management: Should We Be
Converted?, 14 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,222-23 (1984).
268. See infra text accompanying notes 286-92.
269. McGarity, supra note 217, at 205 (distinguishing the technology approach from cost-benefit
analysis).
270. See L. LAvE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION 14 (1981); see also Crandall, supra
note 263, at 104-05 (criticizing BAT approach).
271. 41 Fed. Reg. 46,562 (1976) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.60-.71 (1984)); see also Doniger,
supra note 55, at 576, 583, 585-86.
272. T. Gorman, supra note 173, at 13 (reporting that cost-effectiveness analyses now appear
regularly in analyses of draft emission regulations under section 112).
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should depend on the nature of the specific pollution problem. 273 A ma-
jor defect of section 112 is that it does not provide the EPA Administra-
tor with flexibility in the choice of emission control strategies. The
section contains no authorization for ambient standards, 274 pollution
fees,275 or alienable permits.276 Design, equipment, work practice, and
operational standards are permissible only if the Administrator deter-
mines that quantitative emission standards are infeasible. 277 This pre-
sumptive preference for quantitative emission limits, as opposed to other
strategies, is not justified either by the legislative history of section 112 or
by the technical literature on pollution control.
If section 112 were intended to require that all emissions of hazard-
ous air pollutants be prohibited, then one can understand why the provi-
sion contains little flexibility for the EPA to choose control strategies.
Congress may have envisioned that section 112 would apply only to pol-
lutants that are so hazardous that a flat prohibition of emissions would be
justified. If nonzero amounts of airborne carcinogens are to be permit-
ted, however, then it would seem appropriate to provide the EPA with
flexibility in choosing control strategies. Lacking explicit guidance from
Congress, the EPA has embraced the BAT approach to devising emis-
sion regulations. However, BAT is, in some respects, inferior to emission
fees.278 For example, a firm that installs BAT to control a hazardous air
pollutant may have little incentive to invest research dollars in develop-
ing better control techniques, especially in light of the bureaucratic barri-
ers to the constant updating of BAT standards that would be necessary.
In contrast, an emission fee applied to each unit of a hazardous air pollu-
tant would provide the firm with a constant economic incentive to search
for effective abatement methods. A fee may also result in less costly con-
trol than that required under BAT standards, because firms are generally
in a better position than the EPA to identify efficient control technologies
for a particular source or category of sources. In other situations, the
273. See generally Schelling, Prices as Regulatory Instruments, in INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION 1, 14-40 (rI. Schelling ed. 1983).
274. The original beryllium standards contain a partial ambient approach. See 38 Fed. Reg.
8823, 8830-31 (1973) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.30-.34 (1984)). However, the legality of this ap-
proach has not been tested. See W. ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 278-79 (1977); Currie, supra
note 225, at 1462 (arguing that ambient standards will not survive judicial scrutiny under section
112).
275. See generally A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 51-
53 (1975).
276. See generally Hahn & Noll, Designing a Market for Tradable Emissions Permits, in RE-
FORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 119-46 (W. Magat ed. 1982).
277. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(1) (1982).
278. The ensuing discussion of BAT as opposed to fees is based on R. CRANDALL, supra note 7,
at 58-80.
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EPA may rationally prefer BAT to fees if it wants immediate assurances
that firms will accomplish substantial emission reductions. One can also
imagine an approach that combines BAT standards with emission fees,
thereby reaping some of the benefits of each. The point is that Congress
should allow the EPA to use its considerable expertise in the choice of
control techniques. 279
V. REFORM OF SECTION 112
If section 112 is to be used as the primary statutory basis for regulat-
ing airborne carcinogens, it should be amended to reflect scientific, ad-
ministrative, and economic realities. The current statutory framework
has inadvertently discouraged the EPA from listing and regulating carci-
nogenic pollutants. 280 More realistic procedural and substantive de-
mands on the EPA might reduce the paralysis of decisionmaking that
seems to have afflicted the implementation of the section since its incep-
tion in 1970.281 Some specific reform suggestions follow.
A. Clarify and Simplify the Listing Process.
An affirmative listing decision is the crucial first step toward regula-
tion of a carcinogenic air pollutant. One of the major sources of delay in
implementing the section has been the EPA's uncertainty about the types
of scientific finding necessary or appropriate to justify listing a pollu-
tant.282 Current agency policy requires that a comprehensive health as-
sessment document containing quantitative analysis of multiple health
effects be prepared and approved in writing by the SAB before a pollu-
tant is listed. This process takes anywhere from two to seven years and
delays are often so long that a document requires updating before a first,
279. For an extensive analysis of how fees on emissions or exposure could be employed for air-
borne carcinogens, see Nichols, The Regulation ofAirborne Benzene, in INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION 145, 194-98, 213-19 (T. Schelling ed. 1983); see also A. NICHOLS,
TARGETING INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 159-65 (1983).
280. Robert Hahn has suggested, only partly in jest, that Congress intentionally designed section
112 so that it would be impossible to administer effectively. Congress could then reap the symbolic
benefits of passing clean air legislation without imposing any real costs on the economy. The failure
to achieve tangible environmental improvement could be rationalized to voters as the result of bu-
reaucratic incompetence. Personal communication from Robert Hahn (Aug. 9, 1984).
281. This prediction about bureaucratic behavior, which is central to the argument of this arti-
cle, is consistent with a recent theory developed by John Mendeloff. He postulates a trade-off be-
tween stringency of regulation and what he calls the "extensiveness" of regulation (i.e., the number
of chemicals subject to regulation). The more stringently an agency attempts to regulate toxic chem-
icals, the fewer chemicals it will be able to regulate. Section 112, by mandating extremely strict
emission controls, may be deterring the regulation of carcinogens. Mendeloff, Does Underregulation
Cause Overregulation?, REGULATION, Sept.-Oct. 1981, at 47-52.
282. GAO REPORT ON SECTION 112, supra note 14, at 17.
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unapproved draft has been completed. 283
Congress should amend section 112 to direct the EPA to adopt a
"low-hurdle" approach to listing decisions. A pollutant should be listed
under section 112 as soon as the EPA determines that there is a high
probability of human carcinogenicity. An inference of high probability
could be based either on positive epidemiological data or on positive
animal data. A workable "low-hurdle" process for making carcinogenic-
ity judgments is contained in the EPA's proposed generic policy for air-
borne carcinogens. 284 Alternatively, the EPA could use the
carcinogenicity classifications published by the International Agency for
Research on Cancer. 285 Although Congress should allow the EPA some
flexibility to decide what patterns of scientific data satisfy the "high-
probability" test, the statute should make clear that animal data alone
are sufficient to make an affirmative listing decision. The EPA has yet to
list a pollutant primarily or solely on the basis of animal experiments,
even though a policy of waiting for positive human data is inconsistent
with the precautionary purposes of section 112. The listing would not
necessarily mean that regulation is appropriate; it would simply engage
the process of risk-assessment and cost-effectiveness analysis. Although
more elaborate analyses are appropriate at the regulatory stage, listing
decisions should be made as soon as substantial evidence of carcinogenic-
ity is available to the EPA.
A delay of elaborate analyses until emission controls are proposed is
advisable as a mechanism to conserve limited agency resources. In some
situations, emission controls will be primarily or exclusively a function of
technological and economic feasibility, not of the degree of health risk.
Detailed analyses of carcinogenic potency, noncarcinogenic health ef-
fects, human exposures, population risk, and individual risk should be
conducted only when such analyses would provide useful information in
the selection of source categories for regulation or in the formulation of
emission-control policies. Review by the SAB prior to listing is appropri-
ate to avoid arbitrary or unsubstantiated listings. However, the current
review process is excessively geared to producing scientifically and legally
defensible documents. Congress should clarify that SAB review is in-
tended to be advisory and that it is expected that some pollutants will be
listed as hazardous before a comprehensive health assessment is com-
pleted. In fact, the precautionary purposes of section 112 should cause
some pollutants to be listed, even though certain members of the SAB are
283. Id. at 15-16.
284. Initial Proposed Rule, 44 Fed. Reg.,58,642, 58,647-49 (1979).
285. See, eg., INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, supra note 18, at 20 (on
what constitutes "sufficient" evidence of carcinogenicity).
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not convinced that the pollutants have been shown to be carcinogenic by
scientific studies.
The listing stage should attempt to keep the rate of false negatives
extremely low, even at a cost of a substantial rate of false positives. An
appropriate listing process will inevitably produce a substantial number
of scientifically questionable listings because of the protective nature of
the legislative mandate. The current administrative process is back-
wards-paranoia at the EPA and stringent SAB review have deterred or
delayed all listings except for a few pollutants that have produced dra-
matic evidence of carcinogenic hazard to humans.
B. A Significant-Risk Test.
The existing statutory framework does not explicitly authorize the
EPA to ignore sources of a carcinogenic pollutant that do not pose a
significant risk. In the absence of congressional direction, the EPA is
attempting to devise a significant-risk test on an ad hoe basis, a process
begun in the recent benzene rulemaking. The ethical judgments underly-
ing any significant-risk doctrine are so sensitive that Congress, not the
EPA or the courts, should delineate the nature and limits of the doctrine.
The formulation proposed here is intended to preserve the protective em-
phasis of section 112 while avoiding expenditure of limited agency re-
sources on rulemakings for sources that do not pose a significant risk.
Congress should demand that, once a pollutant is listed, control
strategies be proposed for all source categories that the EPA shows-
subject to substantial-evidence judicial review-pose a significant risk.
The statute should make clear that both population and individual risks
should be estimated for purposes of informing the policy judgment that a
significant risk exists.28 6 Quantitative risk assessments should use con-
servative, though scientifically plausible, assumptions so that it is un-
likely that actual cancer risks are greater than those estimated by the
EPA.28 7 Such assessments would incorporate relevant data and expert
judgment about carcinogenic potency, dose-response functions, and ex-
posure patterns.
In order to justify regulating a source category, the EPA should
have to show that either maximum individual lifetime risk or annual
population risk are greater than certain quantitative thresholds-for ex-
ample, 1o-3 for individuals or one excess case of cancer per year for a
286. On the issue of individual versus population risk, see generally Brooks, The Resolution of
Technically Intensive Public Policy Disputes, Sci. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 45, Winter 1984, at 39.
287. As a matter of administrative practice and public reporting, the EPA should produce both
best estimates and conservative (plausible upper bound) estimates of carcinogenic risk. See Ruckel-
shaus, supra note -197, at 10,191, 10,193.
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source category. Although it is difficult to defend any specific numerical
cutoff, the important point is that the EPA should apply some specific
cutoff on a consistent basis with respect to all pollutants. This doctrine
would assure some consideration of the health of residents living close to
an emission source, even if the total number of persons exposed is small.
It would also assure that widespread population exposure will be consid-
ered, even if the risk to any particular person is slight. Congress should
determine the threshold levels of significant risk, giving due considera-
tion to the health goals of the Clean Air Act and the significant-risk doc-
trine enunciated by Justice Stevens in Industrial Union Department v.
American Petroleum Institute.2 88 All significance and insignificance de-
terminations should be subject to SAB review and defended with pub-
lished rationales in the Federal Register after ample opportunity for
public comment.
Congress should also delete the impossible standard for delisting a
pollutant. In light of the low-hurdle listing process and the less demand-
ing analyses conducted prior to listing, the EPA should be free to delist a
pollutant if, in a published opinion, the Agency produces assessments
that do not suggest significant risk. The criteria for delisting a pollutant
should be the same as the criteria used in assessing whether an unlisted
pollutant should be listed.
C. The Stringency of Emission Control: Unreasonable Risk
If a source category is to be regulated, the EPA must decide how
much emission control is appropriate. The current statutory formula
calls for emission standards with an ample margin of safety to protect the
public health. That test is scientifically misleading, if not dishonest,
when applied to nonthreshold pollutants such as carcinogens. Congress
should rewrite the standard-setting test to call for the elimination of "un-
reasonable risks, ' 289 where reasonability is primarily a function of best
available technology and, secondarily, a balancing of the marginal costs
of emission control against the marginal benefits of control. Emission
288. 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (5-4 decision). The judiciary may apply the significant-risk doctrine,
see supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text, to the Clean Air Act, even though Industrial Union
Dep't was a case dealing with the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
See Latin, The "Significance" of Toxic Health Risks. An Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under
Uncertainty, 10 ECOLOGY L. Q. 339, 341 (1982) (arguing that nothing in the mode of analysis used
by Justice Stevens would restrict application of significant-risk doctrine to OSHA regulation). But
see Doniger, Defeat in Benzene Exposure Case No Death Knell for OSHA Standards, Nat'l L. J.,
Sept. 15, 1980, at 26-27, col. I (arguing that, due to fragmentation of the Court, no law emerged
from Industrial Union Dep't).
289. The criterion of unreasonable risk, which generally calls for discretionary balancing of
health benefits and costs, was used by Congress in the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972, 15
U.S.C. § 2051(b)(1) (1982).
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control requirements more stringent than BAT should be permitted
where the EPA finds that the economic costs of further control would
not be grossly disproportionate to expected benefits. For example,
prohibiting emissions might be appropriate where cancer risks after BAT
remain high and where apparently risk-free, economical substitutes exist
for the chemical or production process in question. Emission control
policies less stringent than BAT should be permitted where the EPA
finds that the marginal costs of BAT are greater than, say, $5 million per
case of cancer averted and individual lifetime risks permitted by a less
stringent policy do not exceed the significance threshold for individu-
als-for example, 10-3 for the most-exposed resident. 290 Where high in-
dividual cancer risks persist, yet population risks are insignificant, the
EPA should be willing to impose a larger expenditure of resources per
case of cancer avoided-say, ten or twenty million dollars per case. This
value judgment reflects considerations of equity for those individuals at
high risk.291
Under the formulation advocated here, BAT would be the presump-
tive remedy subject to modification by the results of cost-benefit analy-
sis. 2 92 If a policy other than BAT is to be adopted, the EPA must
consider any noncarcinogenic health effects associated with low-level ex-
posures to the pollutant. In some cases, it might be necessary to incorpo-
rate different types of health effects into a single benefit measure, which
would then be compared to the cost of the proposed control. Thus, the
statutory framework advocated here would permit, but not require, that
emission-control strategies under section 112 be based on cost-benefit
analysis. As mentioned earlier, the EPA should also be authorized to
consider a broad range of emission-control strategies. In particular, Con-
gress should permit the EPA to make use of ambient standards, design
standards, and economic-incentive approaches as well as quantitative
emission standards.
290. In some cases, it may be more cost-effective to pay residents to move away from plants than
to control emissions at plants. The EPA was considering this approach for some sources of ra-
dionuclides. See Proposed Rule, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,076, 15,079 (1983) (proposed Apr. 6, 1983); see
also supra note 88.
291. This position can be defended on both efficiency and equity grounds. Some economists
believe that citizens facing high fatality risks are willing to pay more for a specified reduction in risk
than are other citizens who face a lower baseline risk but are offered the same specified reduction in
risk. See, eg., Rosen, Valuing Health Risk, AM. ECON. REv., May 1981, at 241, 242 ("those at
greater risk have larger demand prices for safety"); see generally Weinstein, Shepard & Pliskin, The
Economic Value of Changing Mortality Probabilities, 94 Q.J. ECON. 373-95 (1980).
292. On the utility of cost-benefit analysis to environmental decisionmakers, see generally GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BE USEFUL IN ASSESSING ENVIRON-
MENTAL REGULATIONS, DEsPrrE LIMrrAnONS, RCED-84-62 (1984).
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D. Sensible Deadlines for Nondiscretionary Duties.
Section 112 creates nondiscretionary duties to propose and promul-
gate emission standards within strict deadlines. The duties should be re-
tained because the citizen suits they trigger are an essential safeguard
against bureaucratic inertia and footdragging at the EPA. Much of the
regulatory progress under section 112 to date is attributable to citizen
suits by environmental organizations. But in order to minimize the dis-
ruptive effects of court orders, the EPA should be allowed a reasonable
amount of time to discharge these nondiscretionary duties. Congress
should amend the section to allow the EPA two years to propose emis-
sion policies and an additional year for promulgation of final standards.
According to the EPA, these deadlines would allow it sufficient time to
identify the full range of emission sources, perform necessary quantita-
tive risk assessments, obtain SAB review of risk assessments, elicit eco-
nomic and technological data from industrial sources, study emission-
control options, and perform cost-benefit analyses. 293 More realistic
deadlines are necessary to protect the viability of the citizen-suit provi-
sion. If deadlines are not lengthened, the EPA may simply circumvent
the listing process by delaying a public listing until emission regulations
are ready to be proposed.294
VI. CONCLUSION
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 were passed during a pe-
riod of lofty political symbolism about environmental values. Books
such as Rachel Carson's Silent Spring,295 Paul Ehrlich's The Population
Bomb, 296 John Esposito's Vanishing Air,2 9 7 and Barry Commoner's The
Closing Circle298 aroused national concern about environmental degra-
dation. Activists argued that there was an urgent need to reassert envi-
ronmental rights, such as the citizen's right to breathe clean and healthy
air.299 Politicians were engaged in fierce competition to take credit for
passage of health-based environmental legislation and were attracted to
the notion of national approaches to pollution control that were accom-
293. See GAO REPORT ON SECTION 112, supra note 14, at 39; Tabler, supra note 121, at 535.
294. Even Ruckelshaus has publicly hinted that the current statutory deadlines discourage
prompt listings. He has urged Congress to adopt sensible rulemaking deadlines. See 1983 Hearings,
supra note 15, at 61 (statement of William D. Ruckelshaus, Administrator, EPA).
295. R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
296. P. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968).
297. J. EsPosrro, VANISHING AIR (1970).
298. B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE: NATURE, MAN AND TECHNOLOGY (1971).
299. On the notion of a constitutional right to environmental quality, see Schroeder, supra note
42, at 17 & nn.62-63.
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panied by ambitious rulemaking and compliance deadlines.3°°
Section 112 reflects the symbolism of 1970 in its call for the EPA to
set national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants at a level
that protects the public health with an ample margin of safety. No dis-
tinction is made between threshold and nonthreshold pollutants and no
administrative consideration of economics and technology is authorized.
Section 112 is a more dramatic assertion of federal power than the provi-
sions dealing with criteria pollutants because section 112 does not "fiddle
with the niceties of cooperative federalism. ' 30 1 After fifteen years of ex-
perience with section 112, it is time to reassess the effectiveness and desir-
ability of the prevailing approach to control of hazardous air pollutants.
This article addresses regulation of airborne carcinogens because they are
the type of pollutant most commonly considered for control under sec-
tion 112 and are of considerable public concern.30 2
An examination of the EPA's experience with section 112 during
the last fifteen years forces one to conclude that the current regulatory
strategy is unacceptable. Only eight air pollutants have been listed, and
of these, only five have been regulated. Although the EPA identified a
list of thirty-seven "priority" pollutants for consideration in 1977, the
Agency has yet to make significant rulemaking progress with respect to
them. The few pollutants that have been regulated were the subjects of
lengthy delays, procedural litigation, and economically wasteful
standards.
It is Congress, not the EPA, that is primarily responsible for the
failure of section 112. In short, Congress has put the EPA in a virtually
impossible administrative position. In the presence of scientific dispute
about cancer risk assessment, and in the absence of legislative guidance,
how is the EPA supposed to decide which airborne pollutants are "haz-
ardous" within the meaning of section 112? How can the EPA set na-
tional emission standards for nonthreshold pollutants at a level that
protects the public health with an ample margin of safety? If the EPA is
brave and lists a pollutant under section 112, how is it supposed to fulfill
its nondiscretionary duty to propose emission controls for all stationary
sources within six months and promulgate final standards within one
year? Faced with these demands, it is hardly surprising that the EPA
has behaved in a manner that can be criticized.
300. The political struggles between Senators Muskie and Jackson and President Nixon are dis-
cussed in C. JONES, CLEAN AIR: THE POLICS OF POLLUTION CONTROL (1975), and J. DAVIES &
B. DAvIES, supra note 27, at 63.
301. Schroeder, supra note 42, at 30.
302. See 1983 Hearings, supra note 15, at 50-51 (statement of William D. Ruckelshaus, Admin-
istrator, EPA).
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The EPA's traditional response has been to ignore section 112 as
much as possible and to devote its resources to other provisions of the
Clean Air Act.30 3 In an effort to protect itself from scientific, judicial,
and industrial criticism, the EPA has erected a formidable process of
scientific review that allows only the most blatantly carcinogenic air pol-
lutants to be listed under section 112. For the few pollutants that have
been listed, the EPA has openly violated the legislated timetables for
rulemaking and has promulgated emission standards that do not satisfy
the plain language and intent of section 112. Instead of adopting the
zero-emission standards called for by the Act, the EPA has embraced the
concept of best available technology-itself an ill-defined and economi-
cally inefficient approach to pollution abatement.
Despite the fact that it had observed this charade in the EPA's
rulemakings on asbestos and vinyl chloride, Congress decided to ignore
the issue in the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act.30 4 It chose
instead to proceed further with the symbolic approach to pollution con-
trol, chastising the EPA for inaction and compelling the agency to make
decisions on four specific pollutants within short deadlines. Under Ad-
ministrators Costle and Gorsuch, the EPA openly violated the 1977
Amendments by failing promptly to list these pollutants and by failing to
propose timely emission standards. The EPA is now under federal court
order to make rulemaking decisions. The conduct of such litigation has
diverted the EPA from attending to what the Agency regards as more
serious air pollutants.
Key members of Congress are frustrated with the EPA's failure to
list and regulate pollutants under section 112.A0 5 They have diagnosed
the problem as one of bureaucratic footdragging by an agency with pro-
industrial motives-a perception that was enhanced by the Gorsuch ap-
proach to management of the EPA. In response to these perceptions,
environmentalists and their allies in Congress are advocating passage of
amendments to section 112 that would force the EPA to list and regulate
303. See Doniger, supra note 55, at 571 (since 1970, EPA has been reluctant to act under section
112 because officials have been uncomfortable with the statute); see also 1983 Hearings, supra note
15, at 15 (testimony of Joseph A. Cannon, Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, EPA
(EPA historically has had difficulty implementing this section of Clean Air Act).
304. On one interpretation, Congress was unwilling to infuse reality into section 112 because so
many other compromises of the "media-quality-based" approach, see McGarity, supra note 217, at
160 ("the 'media-quality-based' approach focuses on the quality of the receiving media . . . and
requires the agency to promulgate. . . regulations capable of rendering the media acceptably 'safe'
or 'clean' without regard to. . . costs or. . . feasibility"), were being authorized under other provi-
sions of the Clean Air Act. Personal communication from Joe Adamchic, University of Pittsburgh
(Aug. 1984).
305. See generally Dowd, Debate on Hazardous Air Pollutants Continues, 18 ENvTL. Sci. &
TECH. 153A (1984).
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the thirty-seven priority pollutants within fixed deadlines. The most
prominent legislative proposal in the House would retain the health-
based approach as a goal, but permit "interim" standards based on best
available technology in limited circumstances. 30 6 Unfortunately, this ap-
proach contains more political symbolism than pragmatic reform. Con-
gress lacks the expertise and attention span to modify the EPA's
rulemaking priorities in response to evolving data on health effects and
human exposure. The technology approach is a step in the right direc-
tion, but it does not authorize the balancing of marginal costs and health
benefits that the EPA should and inevitably will engage in.
If Congress is serious about control of airborne carcinogens, it will
address itself to the fundamental defects of section 112. By stating
clearly that positive animal data on carcinogenicity are sufficient to jus-
tify listings, Congress would accelerate the listing process. By authoriz-
ing the EPA to exempt source categories that do not pose a significant
risk, Congress would allow the EPA to focus limited rulemaking re-
sources on the most important sources of pollution. By replacing the
approach to emission control that is focused on health alone with one
that permits technological and cost-benefit comparisons, Congress would
tell the truth about how emission standards must inevitably be made; and
by relaxing the rulemaking deadlines to accommodate regulatory analy-
sis, Congress could reduce unnecessary and disruptive litigation.
It is essential that these reforms be adopted as a package. Revision
of the statutory criteria for emission standards, without a simplified list-
ing process, affords no legal leverage for environmentalists when the
EPA does engage in political footdragging. Alternatively, an accelerated
listing without realistic rulemaking deadlines and administrative discre-
tion to balance risks and costs would only lead to economic inefficiency
and industrial backlash in Congress and the judiciary. The early 1970's
were properly a time for Congress to express the public's commitment to
health and environmental goals.307 It is now time for members of Con-
gress to address themselves to the complex issues of implementation. 30 8
The agency-forcing model has simply failed to accomplish the goal of
health protection that section 112 was supposed to advance.
306. See id.; see also H.R. 5084, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Clean Air Act Reauthoriza-
tion-Part 1. Hearings on H.R. 3400 and HR. 5084 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Envi-
ronment, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1984).
307. On the social utility of symbolic commitments to health and environmental goals, see Mc-
Garity, supra note 217, at 193-99.
308. See 1983 Hearings, supra note 15, at 2-3 (statement of Joseph A. Cannon, Assistant Admin-
istrator for Air and Radiation, EPA) (Ruckelshaus EPA takes position that section 112 should be
modified to reflect experience of the 1970's and realities of 1980's).
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